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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY AND THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE

REPORT

OF

SENATOR TIMOTHY E. WIRTH

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

FEBRUARY 3, 1988

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, February 3, 1988.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: With your encouragement, I spent the first two weeks of the new year in Europe gaining a first-hand understanding of our conventional defense capabilities and requirements, and the views of senior military and diplomatic leaders on the impact of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty on our conventional defense posture. I want to take this opportunity to highlight the principal findings of this comprehensive visit. A detailed report is attached.

First, I should note that support for the INF treaty was uniform and in most cases enthusiastic among all U.S. and NATO military and civilian officials with whom I spoke. Frankly, I had expected that. What I had not anticipated was the broad-scale interest in conventional arms control and the genuine sense of momentum toward concrete, militarily-useful proposals in the area of conventional arms control.

There is a clear consensus within the NATO alliance that we must develop a comprehensive proposal for conventional arms reductions, in no small measure because of the political pressure that is being placed on our German allies for further denuclearization. But the momentum behind conventional arms control goes well beyond this political imperative for alliance cohesion.

In part I credit this broad-scale interest, especially as voiced by senior military leaders, to the experience gained by implementing the so-called "Stockholm confidence-building measures." Uniformly, our military leaders felt the observations and inspections conducted under the Stockholm regime have improved our understanding of the capabilities and limitations of Warsaw Pact forces, built a foundation for improved understanding between the East and West, and continue to serve as a useful means of providing advance notice of any aggressive movement by Warsaw Pact nations.

I am convinced that the precedents set by the Stockholm confidence-building procedures, as well as by the INF treaty's provisions for intrusive on-site inspections, which we will begin to implement upon treaty ratification, offer opportunities for effective arms control that we have not had in recent history. While I strongly favor asymmetrical reductions in standing forces in Europe—much along the lines you outlined in your Brussels speech last year (which

would result in movement toward a closer numerical balance in a number of weapons categories)—I also believe that we face unusual opportunities to build on these confidence-building measures.

I think we should give special attention to the possibility of international agreements which are procedural in nature but strategic in design. Expanded confidence-building measures would be an incremental advance over existing arrangements, but would provide the basis for verifying any conventional arms control agreement we can reach. Further, an enlarged regime of confidence-building measures would, in itself, represent a valuable step toward a more stable conventional balance in Europe. I took the liberty of including the draft outlines of such an expanded confidence-building regime in the trip report. It reflects the composite thinking of many different individuals with whom we met on the trip.

I want to thank you for asking me to undertake this visit and the support you provided to insure its success. I would be delighted to discuss any of these issues with you personally as our schedules permit during the coming weeks, and I look forward to assisting with the Committee's actions pertaining to consideration of the INF treaty and with subsequent attention the Committee will give to the conventional balance and conventional arms control. I hope you will call on me when I can be helpful concerning these matters.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH.

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY AND THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE

SUMMARY

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and NATO

Support for the INF treaty in Europe was widespread and generally enthusiastic. No one called for sweeping compensatory investment in conventional forces upon ratification. However, there were two categories of recommended actions in light of INF.

- First, most senior U.S. and allied officials with whom I spoke called for completing the modernization program for tactical nuclear weapons envisioned under the Montebello agreements (stemming from the October, 1983 Autumn Ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at Montebello, Quebec, Canada). [See "NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique" from the Montebello Ministerial meeting, and a report on the status of the implementation of the Montebello agreements by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, included as Appendix G.]
- Second, allied military leaders called for improving the capabilities and sustainability of existing forces rather than an expansion of conventional forces in Europe.

The Conventional Balance in Europe

There is a pervasive atmosphere of confidence and competence among allied military commanders at all levels in Europe—from the highest headquarters down to the lowest operating units. No one is naive about Warsaw Pact military capabilities, but they are aware of Pact limitations, especially in the areas of equipment and of unit quality, training, and morale. NATO commanders expressed confidence that they can blunt the initial stage of any Warsaw Pact assault and deny quick victory. They also believe that our intelligence capabilities and high state of peacetime readiness make the success of a Soviet "bolt out of the blue" attack unlikely. Despite this encouraging picture, there are nagging problems within NATO, especially in the areas of sustainability, interoperability, and transition to wartime mobilization.

Prospects for Conventional Arms Control

Broad-scale interest in conventional arms control exists in all quarters in Europe, as does a genuine sense of momentum toward concrete, militarily-useful proposals for conventional arms control. This sense of momentum springs from three sources:

First, the Federal Republic of Germany is in a difficult position because of INF; it is susceptible to calls for a "third zero" (i.e., eliminating tactical nuclear weapons) which would result in total denuclearization of Europe. Senior military and political observers

in NATO feel that Germany can deflect that pressure if the alliance develops a coherent strategy which includes conventional arms control as a central feature.

Second, the Eastern bloc has very real reasons to press for conventional arms control. The Eastern bloc economies are stagnant. At the same time, there are many tantalizing signs that the Soviet Union may be rethinking its requirements for secure borders, and, perhaps, for the forward-deployed, offensive-capable forces now used to assure border security.

Third, the experience gained by implementing the so-called "Stockholm confidence-building measures" [See *Document of the Stockholm Conference,* appended to this report as Appendix E] has opened the thinking of NATO military commanders to the benefits of "procedural arms control." This experience, combined with the prospect of intrusive on-site inspections provided by the INF treaty, makes major conventional arms control advances possible for the first time since World War II. Components of a hypothetical conventional arms control confidence and security building regime are included in this report.

U.S. Commitment to NATO Must Remain Unmistakably Firm

As conventional arms control negotiations proceed, they must do so against the backdrop of an unmistakably firm U.S. political and military commitment to NATO. Any unilateral reduction in U.S. military presence in Europe at this time would be counterproductive, and would jeopardize the possibility of major achievements in the areas previously outlined.

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal to the Chairman	III
Summary	V
Table of Contents	VII
Introduction	1
I. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and NATO	2
NATO's Assessment of the INF Treaty and Its Effect on NATO's Capability to Defend Europe	2
What NATO's Reactions to the INF Treaty Should Be	2
II. The Conventional Balance in Europe	4
Force Modernization and Preservation Priorities	6
Likelihood of a Soviet Attack, the Importance of Timely Warning of Soviet Mobilization, and Means of Securing Such Warning	8
III. Prospects for Conventional Arms Control	10
Follow-on Nuclear Reductions	12
Conventional Force Reductions	13
Confidence and Security-Building-Measures (CSBMs)	14
Possible CSBM Components of a Conventional Arms Control Regime	15
Discussions on Strategy and Doctrine	17
IV. U.S. Commitment to NATO Must Remain Unmistakably Firm	17
V. Miscellaneous Observations	18
The "Jaruzelski Plan"	18
Impressions of Poland and What They May Indicate About the Warsaw Pact	18
An Observation About West Germany	19
APPENDICES:	
A. Map and Itinerary of Trip	21
B. Key Provisions of the INF Treaty (Charts)	24
C. Statement of General Sir Brian Kenny, Commander of the NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), to the Defense Committee of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany	27
D. Text of the "Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on Decreasing Armaments and Increasing Confidence in Central Europe" (the "Jaruzelski Plan")	30
E. "Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building-Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe"	33
F. "Analysis Report: The Clash Between Civilian Specialists and the Soviet Military Over 'Reasonable Sufficiency' "	44
G. "NATO Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] Communique" from the NPG's Autumn Ministerial meeting at Montebello, Quebec, Canada in October 1983	50
"Status of the NATO Montebello Decision" prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress	53
Acknowledgements	55

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY AND THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

Between January 5 and January 16, 1988, I traveled at the request of Chairman Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee to Europe, where I met with the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, top NATO commanders, commanders of major NATO air and ground force units including U.S. component units, and commanders of other significant NATO and U.S. combat, support, and logistical units. I visited the headquarters; living, working, and maintenance facilities; and field locations of many of these units.

I also met with the U.S. Commander, Berlin and the British and French Berlin commandants, representatives of the ruling coalition and the political opposition of the government of the city of West Berlin, and, in Warsaw, Poland, with senior Polish Foreign Ministry and armed forces officials, Primate of Poland Jozef Cardinal Glemp, and the leadership of the Solidarity and the Freedom and Peace opposition groups.

A complete itinerary and listing of major meetings during the trip is included as Appendix A.

This report contains assessments resulting from the trip concerning NATO's conventional capabilities, the evaluations of senior NATO and U.S. military and civilian officials of the likely effects of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, their recommendations concerning what NATO and the U.S. should do to assure continued strength of the NATO alliance and protection of freedom in Western Europe, and an assessment of the state of thought in both NATO/U.S. circles and among Polish leaders and other Warsaw Pact military officials concerning conventional arms control.

I. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and NATO

NATO's Assessment of the INF Treaty and Its Effect on NATO's Capability to Defend Europe

Every military and political leader with whom I spoke in the NATO organizations I visited endorsed the INF Treaty and urged its ratification, usually enthusiastically. Supreme Allied Commander/Europe (SACEUR) John R. Galvin (U.S. Army) said failure to ratify the treaty would cause "consternation" in the alliance, and this perspective also was broadly shared.

General Sir Brian Kenny (United Kingdom), Commander of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), in a statement to the Defense Committee of the Bundestag of the FRG in Bonn on January 13 [see entire text of General Kenny's speech—Appendix C], reflected the views I heard from all senior commanders:

> I am sure every military commander welcomes the INF agreement with [its] overall reduction of nuclear weapons. I also welcome any future arms control agreements—*provided* that these agreements will lessen the tension between East and West, and *provided* they lead to greater international stability. [emphasis in original]
>
> Nuclear weapons will continue to be essential to maintain a credible and cost effective deterrence.
>
> In pursuing further arms control agreements, we must . . . examine the case for modernisation of our remaining theatre nuclear weapons and, at the same time, do what we can to improve the combat effectiveness of our conventional forces . . .

The military leaders with whom I met agreed that the INF treaty will not eliminate NATO defense options. It eliminates *weapons systems.* All agreed that continued fulfillment of the necessary military purposes of these systems can be assured by retargeting other systems already in NATO's inventory and by force modernization fully permissible under the terms of the Treaty.

In summation, our discussions with numerous NATO military and political officials lead to the conclusion that the INF Treaty will have no adverse impact on NATO or its ability to deter war in Europe or to blunt an attack should deterrence fail.

What NATO's Reactions to the INF Treaty Should Be

Actually, the NATO leaders with whom I spoke were not particularly interested in dwelling on INF. They consider the subject closed. They were far more interested in talking about what comes next—in the areas of arms control and conventional defense. Everyone agreed that the INF agreement makes conventional defense

more important, and that the next steps the allies take in both these areas are of critical importance to the future of the alliance and to its ability to preserve the peace.

NATO officials claimed that "flexible response" remained a valid military strategy—so long as NATO's tactical nuclear capability is maintained and modernized. Many referred to the *de facto* success of nuclear deterrence in Europe since World War II, and compared the stability and absence of war during that period to the history of scores of major conflicts in Europe during the previous several hundred years. One senior political leader with whom we met emphasized the view that conventional forces alone cannot deter war. Some sources did express concern that NATO has not kept pace with the Soviets in nuclear force modernization. In this regard we need to review the decisions concerning modernization that are embodied in the 1983 Montebello Agreement [see explanatory material on this Agreement—Appendix G], and assess the progress made in reaching the milestones it established. Significantly, NATO officials did not describe a need for *new* nuclear weapons systems beyond the components of the modernization specified in the Montebello Agreement.

While almost everyone stated that the INF treaty increases the priority we must place on conventional forces, no one called for sweeping compensatory investment in or increases to conventional forces. Allied military leaders did call for *improving existing forces.* General Kenny summarized it best when he said, "We need to look at improving existing forces, because expanding them is unrealistic," reflecting, as did others, that all NATO nations are facing budget constraints, and that West European countries also are facing serious demographic problems which prevent consideration of significant force expansion in the present atmosphere.

All of the commanders stressed improving the quality and "staying power" of existing forces. General Kenny emphasized the need for improved sustainability and interoperability, both of which are key problems he faces in NORTHAG. General Kenny and General Glenn K. Otis, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army/Europe and Commander of NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG), both called for retaining high priority for training and exercises, citing the tremendous benefit of the most recent REFORGER (REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercise conducted in the fall of 1987. Independently, each noted that REFORGER 87 was an impressive display of alliance solidarity and commitment to the conventional defense of Europe. (This was the first REFORGER exercise that focused primarily on the NORTHAG area, and it was held in nearly the same time frame as, and was coordinated with, six other NATO exercises. [Because of the Stockholm Agreement, Soviets and representatives of other Warsaw Pact nations observed the exercise for almost its entire six week duration.]) The success of REFORGER 87 impressed our NATO allies with our commitment to the defense of Europe and, in the words of one senior NATO intelligence officer, "certainly got the attention of the Soviets."

General Otis was emphatic in stating that supplementary investment in a post-INF environment should concentrate on enhancing our ability to reinforce NATO forces adequately and in a timely manner. He singled out military sealift as one of the areas needing

most attention. While airlift provides a dramatic symbol, the bulk of reinforcements will come by sea, and modern sealift capacity is indispensable. This is an area on which we must focus more carefully.

II. The Conventional Balance in Europe

Morale is high among NATO military leaders and in component units of NATO's forces (including U.S. units), and broad agreement exists among those whom I met, from the highest echelon to operational units, that their forces could successfully meet and turn back the first phase of a Warsaw Pact attack should deterrence fail. Allied confidence appeared to be, and was described as being, much stronger than is often represented to the public, and significantly improved in the last decade. Key deficiencies and problems remain, however; they are sustainability, interoperability, and susceptibility to chemical weapons, plus the political problems that Western democracies would face if they had to transition to wartime mobilization. With respect to this last problem, the political difficulties of mobilizing, in turn, could create another serious problem: possible delays in putting optimum war-fighting capability in the positions stipulated in NATO's operational plans.

While the Pact has advantages in such areas as armor, artillery, and follow-on echelons better positioned to reinforce an attack, NATO has advantages in troop training, mobility, and air support and deep air interdiction. One of the especially significant results of the extensive series of meetings which occurred during our trip was the confirmation that the conventional "bean count" is not a particularly useful or accurate measure of the true conventional balance. Quantitative analysis is undeniably one component of assessing the nature of balance or imbalance, and is an important device for establishing baselines for arms control initiatives. But when the object of the analysis is to determine how well forces can perform their missions—or to make the stark, ultimate assessment of which side would prevail if conflict erupts—other factors such as the quality of weapons systems and the men and women who employ them, training, leadership and morale, force structure and organization, and the doctrine underpinning the employment of those forces also are very important determinants of the true picture of the military balance.

General Kenny and Lieutenant General Dieter Clauss, Commander of the I (GE) Corps, emphasized advances during recent years in the ability of alliance component forces to operate together. Kenny added that this derives from joint training and cooperatively-determined, shared doctrine. But this progress has not been matched in areas of weapons systems, communications, and equipment. He strongly urges that interoperability be an integral requirement of modernization and new weapons programs. He noted that in the four corps under his command, there are five or six different rifles, four different main battle tanks, four different attack helicopters, and four primary communications systems that cannot be used for communications with each other. This lack of interoperability is his greatest concern. He acknowledged that the problem is deep-seated and cannot be reversed overnight, but he observed

that reversal must start with a first step, and that the operational commanders must voice their concerns strongly to the individual defense establishments, and effectively communicate their views of how critical interoperability is so that achieving this objective will be given a high priority. It is imperative that those in alliance nations who must make political decisions concerning such matters listen to the commanders' concerns and act to address them satisfactorily.

General Kenny also acknowledged that combat sustainability remains a key problem in NORTHAG. He argued that the situation has improved somewhat in recent years, but confirmed former SACEUR General Bernard Rogers' statement that SACEUR might be forced to request release of nuclear weapons in "days not weeks" after commencement of hostilities because NATO would lack the capacity to sustain successful conventional-only defensive operations.

Diverse sources expressed some concern about NATO's "unilateral obsolescence" in the face of continued Soviet modernization. Among the commanders, who recognize that "everyone has budget problems," there is a widespread fear that attempts will be made to resolve them, in part, by slowing or eliminating programs aimed at modernizing NATO forces. That is specifically true in the case of U.S. forces modernization (which, while well under way, is only partially complete; some key systems are just beginning to reach forward-deployed forces).

One factor that offers some considerable hope is that, in the not-too-distance future, NATO armaments *could* be coordinated; we and our allies have the industrial and technological capability to equip the alliance with a single family of systems. But this certainly is no guarantor of success in attaining this objective. While the technological problems can be resolved, there will be major political obstacles to overcome in all NATO governments, with our own definitely being no exception.

Many observers noted independently that there is little cooperation among the allies in intelligence-gathering. Enhanced cooperation in this area must be encouraged even though we recognize the necessity to preserve independence and security of sensitive collection means.

While NATO sometimes appears to face insurmountable difficulties as it tries to reconcile the disparate views of its member nations, the image of endless bickering is only partially accurate. Definite progress in achieving consensus has occurred in the area of military doctrine, and a good example is the new concept of operations which NORTHAG is developing. Rather than rigid adherence to a doctrine requiring application of all available forces on the front lines in order to defend at the border, NATO now envisions a thinner covering force and more robust reserve forces. Under this revised concept, NATO not only will *permit* Warsaw Pact penetrations, but will *"invite"* them in areas where reserve forces can counter-attack the exposed flanks of such penetrating forces.

This revised, more flexible concept of operations was first developed by General Nigal Bagnal, former commander of NORTHAG, three years ago. Obviously, this concept of operations is somewhat

in tension with the West German political imperative to defend at the border—historically the West Germans have adamantly insisted on all-out defense of every square foot of German territory, but in recent months they appear to have accepted the concept quietly. (In the way of explanation, two senior officers [not West Germans] commented that the high-level leadership of the Bundeswehr is much more flexible now than in earlier periods, a fact attributed in part to the departure of general officers in the Bundeswehr who saw service in World War II [the last one of which recently retired].) General Clauss was quick to point out that his Government's policies still call for a firm defense at the border. But he also noted that NATO does not have sufficient forces to absorb the losses that would come with a static defense at the border and that it was necessary to create tactical depth in the battlefield.

FORCE MODERNIZATION AND PRESERVATION PRIORITIES

As noted previously, there is a consensus among those with whom we talked that U.S. force modernization should continue. But it must be recognized that the continued modernization of U.S. forces committed to NATO will take place in a resource-constrained environment. NATO forces, and U.S. forces in Europe, must carefully define their priority needs and adhere to them. Based on my discussions with senior leaders and my observations of U.S. forces in Europe, I believe those priorities include:

Strategic lift.—Our ability to reinforce and sustain forward-deployed forces is tenuous. It is substantially dependent on fast sea lift to move heavy equipment and supplies to Europe, and on the means of rapidly dispersing those to the receiving forces. In response to my asking him what were his most pressing needs, General Kenny told me it was not additional fighting units—he said he could not make effective use of any more active forward-deployed forces in his Army Group area. Instead, he said he is most concerned with the timely mobilization and movement of reinforcements and sustainment forces to his sector. General Otis, as previously noted, thinks acquiring adequate modern sea lift capacity is critically important, and should be one of NATO's (and the U.S.'s) highest priorities.

Living and working conditions for U.S. troops and dependents.—By every measure, the U.S. forces now assigned to the European commands are the best their commanders remember seeing. If we are to preserve the significant qualitative edge over the Warsaw Pact provided by these forces, there must be continuing—and in some cases significant—improvement in the quality of life for our troops and their dependents. With 53 percent of U.S. troops in Europe married, family concerns affect the morale of the whole force. Military construction programs aimed at improving barracks, housing, and maintenance and work areas must continue. We must also ensure that the hospitals, schools, and child development centers used by our personnel and their families are properly maintained and, where required, improved on schedule. Some such facilities currently in use are in unacceptable condition and some of

those defy suitable, cost-effective renovation and must be replaced. The impact of fluctuations in the value of the dollar on service men and women and their families—especially young married couples in the lower pay grades who are "living on the economy" (i.e., living in rental housing off base)—must be carefully monitored, and adjustments made to compensate for major fluctuations. Of special promise in this regard is the program under which the Army leases family housing and then makes it available to service families. This program could be expanded immediately at little if any increased cost to the Army (or, in turn, to U.S. taxpayers).

Pilot retention.—Related to general personnel considerations, including those of living and working conditions noted above, but with sufficient importance to stand alone, is the special concern of Air Force officials about pilot retention. The Air Force reports that it is retaining only 48 percent of its pilots when a 72 percent retention rate is required to meet the Air Force's needs. Within our budget limitations, those factors which will contribute to greater retention must be identified and addressed. Our widely acknowledged qualitative edge in air power depends substantially on well-trained, experienced pilots—and that edge must not be permitted to erode.

Weapons systems and equipment.—We must direct limited research and development dollars to programs that offer the greatest potential return. Equipment that promises to increase operational and tactical target detection and identification, such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar (JSTAR) System should be high priority. Systems designed to break up and destroy follow-on forces, such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), also should receive priority attention. The Army needs to focus its attention on the armor/anti-armor question and develop a coordinated program for dealing with the introduction of reactive armor in the theater by the Soviets. Identification of friend or foe (IFF) remains a serious problem for all NATO air forces and requires both technological and NATO-wide acquisition policy attention.

Hardened shelters for NATO aircraft.—NATO has made considerable progress in providing hardened shelters for its aircraft. These shelters offer a host of benefits: protection against attack (so that only direct hits or near misses of conventional munitions are likely to cause significant damage); concealing the aircraft and thereby making assessment by the Warsaw Pact of the number, equipment, and condition of the aircraft more difficult; protecting the aircraft and associated equipment from the elements; and making maintenance easier for NATO crews to perform, especially in the harsh months of the German winter. The effort should be continued and strengthened. Both Pact and NATO officials agree that NATO's aircraft make critical contributions to the effectiveness of its forces, and offset to some degree the numerical advantages of the Pact in such areas as armor and personnel—and we must offer all possible protection to this vital asset.

Hard stands and covered storage and maintenance facilities.—Despite efforts over the past several years to "get the

Army out of the mud," substantial amounts of U.S. weaponry, equipment, and supplies are stored and maintained out of doors—and often on unpaved surfaces. The elements take their toll on very expensive equipment, shortening its useful life. The key maintenance tasks which must be performed by our maintenance troops are often more difficult to perform when they must be done, literally, "in the mud" or in makeshift temporary structures, tents, or dilapidated structures which in some cases date back to the pre-World War II era. To the fullest extent the budget will permit, we should accelerate the effort to provide maintenance hard stands; storage areas for vehicles and weapons which at least are paved and which are covered wherever possible; and adequate, usable covered storage areas for equipment and supplies.

Preparedness for chemical warfare.—Warsaw Pact chemical warfare, with chemicals delivered by aircraft and missiles and by special forces, are a major threat to NATO, both with respect to forces at the front and to lines of communication (LOCs) and air and sea ports essential for reinforcement and resupply of NATO forces. Much greater thought and attention must be devoted to dealing with this threat and assuring NATO forces, and the critically important civilian host nation support organizations on which they depend so heavily, can operate successfully in a chemical environment. This matter is addressed further at a later point.

LIKELIHOOD OF A SOVIET ATTACK, THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMELY WARNING OF SOVIET MOBILIZATION, AND MEANS OF SECURING SUCH WARNING

All military people with whom we talked consider the likelihood of a "bolt out of the blue" Warsaw Pact attack to be quite low as long as the present military balance and NATO's current state of readiness is maintained. Most thought any Soviet attack was unlikely absent significant changes in NATO posture, dramatic change in the relationship between the superpowers or in their governments, some dangerous, destabilizing event outside Europe, or a notable diminution of the U.S. presence in or commitment to Europe.

Parenthetically, although the Soviets and their allies portray the Warsaw Pact as a defensive alliance and insist their forces are deployed to receive a NATO attack, none of the East Bloc people with whom we spoke could envision an attack from the West. When pressed for a description of a political scenario leading to a NATO decision to launch a preemptive attack, none could cite an example in Soviet/Warsaw Pact military or political literature.

We were told by several senior NATO and U.S. officials that the perception widely held for some time by U.S. and allied military leaders of NATO's qualitative superiority over the Warsaw Pact was reinforced by recent U.S. observations and inspections of Warsaw Pact maneuvers under the provisions of the confidence-building measures that were included in the agreement resulting from the Stockholm Conference which met from 1984 to 1986. I spoke with several of the members of our official observation teams

and inspection teams and discussed this topic with Generals Galvin, Otis, Kenny, and Clauss and their intelligence staffs.

What emerges is a complex picture. The Soviet Union has a massive amount of weapons and equipment, much of it of excellent design. But maintenance of that equipment is uneven and in some cases apparently quite poor. East German units receive superior training; the Czechoslovakian Army also was given high marks for its training. Soviet training, however, is rudimentary and artificial, largely because the Soviets are forced to rotate personnel every six months; that effectively limits training to only the most basic skills. There is no permanent cadre of noncommissioned officers in the Soviet armed forces, the role of which is so important in Western forces. Relationships among units from the several Warsaw Pact nations are uneven and at times poor.

We spent considerable time discussing these observations with a senior officer who was on the U.S. observation team. When he was asked, "Do you feel the Soviets are still 10 feet tall?" he replied, "I'm not sure they aren't 5 feet 6."

Our military leaders do not unrealistically discount Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities, but their assessment of those capabilities is not overinflated by fear; their assessment is one that recognizes substantial strengths and weaknesses on the part of Pact forces as well as on the part of NATO forces. The net assessment is the origin of the substantial confidence among NATO forces which I referenced earlier. General Otis went so far as to say that, while the Soviets unquestionably are poised strategically for offensive operations, they are not poised tactically to undertake them.

Consequently, before the Soviets could launch an attack with any hope of success, some degree of mobilization would be required. At every NATO headquarters we visited, intelligence staffs expressed confidence that any Soviet mobilization would be detected by a variety of means, and would probably take significantly longer than NATO projections for optimal Soviet preparations. That warning time, of course, theoretically would permit NATO to move all its forces into defense plan positions and commence reinforcement and resupply efforts—steps that would be critical to maximizing the likelihood of successfully defeating an attack.

Many expressed concern, however, that Western governments could have difficulty responding with sufficient rapidity to a warning that Pact mobilization may be underway. In such a situation, Western governments expeditiously must authorize mobilization of their reserves, move deployed forces forward to man their defensive positions and prepare the battlefield, and move reinforcements and sustainability forces and supplies into the theater. Some concern was expressed about how often democratic societies would permit movement to alert and mobilization status in response to political "feints" by the Pact such as occurred in 1973.

As noted earlier, concerns were voiced by a number of military planners with whom we met about the vulnerability of allied aerial and sea ports, especially to chemical warfare. Interdiction of these ports would seriously hamper U.S. ability to reinforce or sustain forward deployed forces, and jeopardize our ability to honor our "ten divisions in ten days" commitment to NATO. The ability to detect and respond to Soviet mobilization would prove crucial to

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taking timely defensive measures around these facilities—a matter likely even more politically sensitive than movement of armed forces and mobilization of reserves, since many such facilities are not under the control of armed forces and are located some distance from the anticipated front lines—and since they often are staffed preponderantly by civilians. Many are key assets of privately-owned businesses whose operations such preparations for war would disrupt.

We and our allies clearly understand the importance of warning time and know the telltale signals of Pact mobilization. Our ability to discriminate between routine exercises and mobilization for war would be enhanced if we could monitor key rail network bottlenecks and important weapons and equipment storage sites; develop techniques to assure ourselves that Soviet divisions in the East are consistently rotating 25 percent of their troops every six months as is their standard practice; and increase our capability to determine the significance of large movements of Soviet transport aircraft. These steps, along with others suggested by NATO officers, should be pursued as part of an expanded confidence- and security-building regime which will be examined at a later point in this document.

In summary, the consensus among those with whom I spoke is that the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Europe is low at least at this time—in large part because it is NATO's perception that the Soviets believe NATO will have sufficient warning of Soviet mobilization to make the preparations for battle that would unaffordably increase the risk that a Soviet attack would be defeated. There is broad interest among NATO commanders, however, in enhancing and expanding all useful means of increasing warning time and the reliability of warning signals.

III. Prospects for Conventional Arms Control

We find ourselves in one of those rare historical periods when circumstances converge to permit significant progress toward arms control and arms reductions. The Soviet economy is under considerable strain, and the economies of a number of Eastern European nations may be in even poorer condition. The Polish economy, for example, is in serious straits—a fact openly acknowledged by every Polish official, civilian and military, with whom we talked. Increasingly, the Soviets and their allies recognize the need to redirect resources from defense to domestic priorities. A related factor is that it appears that these economies, especially those in Eastern Europe, would have enormous difficulty sustaining a modern war effort over any substantial period of time; the more stable economies of NATO nations would have advantages in this regard.

Soviet political scientists and military leaders are debating the need to maintain large offensively-organized armies in Eastern Europe as they wrestle with their domestic needs. They are discussing altered concepts proposed by Soviet civilian leaders with the apparent object of reducing investments in armaments as substantially as possible while assuring continued national security. These concepts have been labeled in some quarters as concepts of "reasonable sufficiency," and they appear to focus on three issues; (1)

evaluation of military parity based on qualitative as well as strict quantitative criteria; (2) inclusion of estimates of an adversary's intentions in addition to his military capability when calculating the level of military force needed for security; and (3) emphasizing achievement of national security through political means, such as negotiation, rather than principally by projection or use of military strength. [See Appendix F.]

Although it is premature to conclude that this talk of "reasonable sufficiency" will pave the way to serious conventional arms reduction proposals by the Soviets, especially since there are signs the Soviet military leadership is resistant to movement in this direction, the debate nonetheless bears close watching—because the outcome could mean even greater opportunities for negotiated arms reductions.

The West also strains under large defense budgets—at a time when many of the governments of NATO nations are encountering overall budgetary difficulties. While Western economies do not appear to be in the same degree of jeopardy as many in the Eastern Bloc, many of their political leaders would very much like to reduce defense expenditures and, in most cases at the very least, see no way to *increase* defense expenditures to cover new or renewed arms races.

At the same time both the East and the West are increasingly aware that war in Europe, whether it involves exchange of nuclear weapons or remains limited to use of conventional arms, would be more destructive than any previous conflict on the continent. There is an openly expressed awareness in Poland, for example, that the destruction would be widespread, and not limited to Germany on each side of the Inter German Border (IGB). Poland expects to be the target of follow-on forces attacks by NATO aircraft and missiles in either a nuclear or conventional war, and is issuing strong claims that this is one reason why it is very seriously pursuing further arms control and armament reduction efforts to follow the INF Treaty. The Benelux countries, among others in the West, share similar concerns and objectives. And, of course, the political leaders of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have expressed a desire to continue the momentum generated by the INF agreement.

The question is: Where do we go from here?

The conversations with NATO and Warsaw Pact officials during our trip, and information obtained prior to departure, indicate the wisdom of pursuing several arms control courses simultaneously: (A) *START negotiations pertaining to strategic weapons systems;* (B) *conventional arms control negotiations*—switching the venue from the Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MURFAAMCE) negotiations that began in Vienna in 1973 (and to which reference generally is made as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] talks) to 23-nation Atlantic-to-the-Urals negotiations scheduled to begin in June in Vienna; (C) *negotiations to establish further confidence- and security-building measures* not necessarily attached to any treaty; and (D) *discussions of strategy and military doctrine.*

The START negotiations, of course, have been underway in Geneva for some time. They naturally focus on the U.S. and the

Soviet Union which possess the large strategic nuclear weapon arsenals. Other NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, while much affected by any product from these negotiations, nonetheless are not central participants.

The last three of the four items noted above have a substantial European focus, and directly affect and involve all NATO and Pact nations. Discussions with respect to these three appear to have progressed substantially further in Europe, including among senior U.S. military officials, than here in the U.S. The Polish government very obviously has devoted a great amount of thought and effort to preparations on this subject, reflected in the so-called "Jaruzelski Plan" which General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's chief of state, advanced last fall. East German chief of state Erich Honecker has advocated rapid action directed toward elimination of remaining European-based nuclear weapons. NATO, while not as far advanced in its thinking or preparations as Poland, nonetheless is already working diligently on this matter, and its efforts already are well beyond the level of discussion here in the U.S. It is imperative that the allies move rapidly to expand and elaborate on the general consensus that appears to have emerged within NATO (1) in order that the allies will be able to engage vigorously in the negotiations that will begin in June; (2) so NATO can push for arms control advances in other arenas while the atmosphere is conducive, and (3) so no political advantage will accrue to the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact nations.

The Jaruzelski Plan is much more an *agenda* for arms control negotiations than an arms control regime or plan. It was developed independently by the Polish—without Soviet involvement. It proposes four areas for discussion and agreement: (1) gradual denuclearization of Europe; (2) gradual withdrawal or reduction of specified conventional weapons systems from Europe, with emphasis on offensive systems such as tanks, attack aircraft and helicopters, long-range artillery, and multiple rocket launchers; (3) mutual devolution of opposing military doctrines from offensive to defensive orientation; and (4) further observation and inspection arrangements and other confidence-building measures, to be built on those stemming from the Stockholm agreement. [Further details of the Jaruzelski Plan appear later in this report. The full text of the Plan, as provided by the Polish Foreign Ministry, appears as Appendix D to this report.]

Based on my discussions with NATO and U.S. leaders in Europe, Polish leaders, and others during my trip, I believe the U.S. and NATO should proceed energetically to construct and pursue a European-focused arms control agenda with the following characteristics:

1. Follow-on nuclear reductions

Warsaw Pact initiatives (Honecker's "Third Zero," and the first part of the Jaruzelski Plan) propose immediate discussions on short-range nuclear force (SNF) reductions. Because of widespread German fear that any exchanges of tactical nuclear weapons would occur primarily on German soil, this proposal has understandable and considerable appeal to many West Germans, especially to the coalition of the Social Democratic and Green parties. This so-called

"special German problem" was intensified by negotiations of the INF Treaty which eliminates the long-range theater nuclear missiles. The absence of the INF missiles requires NATO to place heavier reliance for its nuclear deterrence on SNFs, and makes use of SNFs more likely if NATO concludes it must "go nuclear" in order to avoid defeat in any conflict.

In Geneva, the U.S. has opposed moving in the direction of SNF reductions at this time. There is general consensus in NATO that further discussion concerning SNF cuts should wait until after agreements have been achieved at the strategic force level in the START negotiations, and in the area of conventional forces.

The "special German problem" has the potential for creating strains within the alliance, and adds additional pressure for NATO to address the "triple zero" proposal. While adhering to the determination that negotiations on SNF reductions should wait for a START agreement and significant progress in conventional arms control, this problem can be met in part by clear alliance agreement on the post-INF negotiating agenda, and in part by reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons on German soil. Some such reductions should be one result of nuclear force modernization and other force changes previously agreed to at Montebello.

2. Conventional force reductions

Clearly the Warsaw Pact is concerned about the conventional balance. The Jaruzelski Plan, which suggests the possibility of asymmetrical reductions in certain categories of weapons systems, and recent talk of "reasonable sufficiency" on the part of Soviet arms control experts and General Secretary Gorbachev, amount to a tacit acknowledgement that the Pact has more forces than it needs for defense and is willing to make reductions in return for a trade-off of Western systems that they most fear. It is equally clear that the forces that most concern the Pact are our dual-capable aircraft and our growing ability to attack, disrupt, and destroy their follow-on forces.

Warsaw Pact proposals to discuss reductions limited only to an inner-European zone should be rejected. Soviet forces removed from this zone easily could redeploy to Western Russia while U.S. forces removed from West Germany would have to return to the United States. Conventional force reductions should be considered only in the context of an Atlantic-to-the-Urals agreement, with Soviet withdrawals to points east of the Urals being roughly equivalent to U.S. withdrawls of personnel (but not equipment) to the Continental U.S.

NATO must agree on a unified position before entering into serious conventional arms reduction negotiations. Despite the limited usefulness of quantitative analysis when applied to the conventional balance, NATO also will have to agree on what forces it will permit to be considered for inclusion in the discussions and on the quantities of those forces that it will offer as a baseline for discussion.

Prior to the commencement of such negotiations, and until they produce an acceptable agreement, modernization of NATO forces should continue along the lines discussed earlier in this report.

Conventional arms control and reduction talks, when they begin, probably will move slowly. Rapid and dramatic breakthroughs leading to the mutual redeployment or reduction of forces facing each other along the IGB appear unlikely. We were impressed, however, that U.S. and NATO military leaders generally thought that agreements could be reached more rapidly than did political officials.

3. Confidence- and security-building measures

While negotiating Atlantic-to-the-Urals conventional arms reductions could take a significant amount of time, it appears that rapid progress *can* be made in other very beneficial areas. Within the context of the new round of talks under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) scheduled to begin in the summer, we should press for an expansion of the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) agreed to in Stockholm in 1986. [See "Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe," which is included as Appendix E.]

These measures permit direct inspection and observation of military operations in two categories. Participating states are required to provide one another with an annual calendar of military activities involving more than 40,000 troops, and are prohibited from conducting activities involving more than 75,000 troops without providing prior notification to other signatories. Participating members are required to invite observers to exercises involving more than 17,000 troops. In addition, participating states are permitted to make challenge inspections, subject to some limitations, of another participating state's territory where compliance with the terms of agreement is in doubt.

These observation and inspection agreements are viewed in Europe as holding great beneficial promise, but as yet appear to be little recognized or understood in the United States. Broad consensus exists among NATO leaders with whom we spoke that they are more to NATO's advantage than the Pact's. One senior intelligence staff officer noted aptly: "We are an open society. They already travel at will in our rear areas—upgrading their maps, photographing bridges, and, to a lesser extent, observing troops and military installations. Anything we can do to increase our access to their territory increases our knowledge and understanding of their procedures."

Such observations and inspections make a number of contributions. Most importantly, they refine our capability to spot and correctly identify a Soviet/Pact mobilization, and simultaneously provide an important means of *employing* that capability when there are concerns that a mobilization may be in progress.

There are many areas where the existing agreement can be expanded. The following suggestions were among those offered in various meetings and conversations during my trip: (1) there could be a higher annual limit on the number of challenge inspections, and the duration of those inspections could be extended (they currently are limited to 48 hours); (2) the scope of the military activities covered by the agreement could be expanded to include movement of aircraft and unusual movements in and around major rail yards and supply points; and (3) limitations on the use of cameras by in-

spectors could be removed or relaxed, and use of video cameras permitted.

Such measures do not come without cost. The costs of fulfilling U.S. responsibilities under the Stockholm agreement already are substantial, and these costs will be expanded dramatically by related measures that are a part of the verification regime of the INF Treaty. [See "Key Treaty Provisions—Inspection Regime," one of several charts which, as a package, compose Appendix B.] Use of helicopters and communications equipment must be provided to observers and inspectors from the Pact countries. Our own inspections and observations of Pact activities require a cadre of observers and inspectors who are fluent in Russian and other Pact languages as well as expert in Pact equipment and procedures and those key activities or circumstances which are vital indicators of Pact intentions and capabilities, and capable in intelligence-gathering techniques appropriate to their mission. Currently the burden is carried by a small number of Army personnel headquartered at U.S. EUCOM. The verification procedures of the INF Treaty will require an increase in the size of this cadre, and any further expansion of CSBMs and verification activities will require commensurate increases. The Congress and the Department of Defense must be cognizant of these increasing needs, and provide appropriately to cover their costs.

Another potentially valuable CSBM would be establishment of routine meetings between senior NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders. General Galvin told me he would like to meet with his counterpart, Soviet Marshall Kulikov: "I'd tell him what worries me, and ask what worries him." General Otis said he and his counterpart ought to meet every two months. "If he doesn't show up, maybe that's a sign that something is wrong." At present, various NATO and DOD regulations prohibit these exchanges; priority attention should be given to reviewing these rules with an eye toward loosening them to encourage greater officer contact and discussion. Such meetings would be worthwhile as a CSBM in and of themselves. In addition, they would serve as precursors to discussions between NATO and Warsaw Pact officials concerning strategy and doctrine, addressed subsequently in this section of the report.

POSSIBLE CSBM COMPONENTS OF A CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL REGIME

While expanded CSBMs can and should be negotiated separately from arms reductions measures, they also will be crucial components of any arms reduction agreements—as are the verification procedures in the INF agreement. I was impressed in my conversations during my trip that NATO commanders and senior officers are interested in attempting to link an arms reduction proposal to expanded use of intrustive on-site inspections similar to those established by the Stockholm Agreement. No one set forth a complete, detailed proposal, but it is possible to envision CSBM components of a conventional arms control regime which could form the basis for an alliance approach to future negotiations:

—Build on the success of the INF and Stockholm Agreement on-site inspection programs.
—Build on the structure of Stockholm Agreement CSBMs—with formal observations by the international community and challenge inspections by individual countries.
—Depend on national technical means for day-to-day verification, with inspection teams mobilized in the event of suspicious activity.

Applying these components to a hypothetical conventional arms control agreement yields the following:

—Assume that NATO and the Warsaw Pact adopt a conventional arms control agreement resulting in NATO and the Warsaw Pact removing forces from the border area. [An appealing plan was proposed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn last year in Brussels, which would entail NATO removing two divisions and the Soviets removing 13 divisions beyond the Urals. This would leave roughly equal forces along the IGB and roughly comparable mobilization and redeployment times to return those forces to Europe.]
—Require multilateral inspection teams to observe the removal of forces.
—Place multilateral inspection teams permanently at key transportation nodes (seaports, POMCUS [Prepositioning Of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets] sites, rail transportation sites, etc.).
—Establish multilateral inspection teams to visit the new garrisons of repositioned forces.
—Any signatory nation must permit at least two challenge inspections every calendar quarter if requested, until there have been four inspections in a year, after which only one such inspection a quarter must be permitted for the remainder of the year. (This would be a maximum requirement of six challenge inspections per year of any nation if the signatories' rights to such inspections were fully exercised.) The objective of this construct is to prevent a nation from stimulating all of the challenge inspections it is required to permit during a year in the first portion of the year, thereby freeing it from any further challenge inspections for the remainder of the year during which a potentially critical massing of forces could be accomplished. Challenge inspections should be permitted to last for a minimum of 72 hours and encompass up to five sites simultaneously. Other rules now applying to Stockholm Agreement inspections would apply.
—It is desirable that there be very few "restricted areas" not subject to inspection. To the extent restricted areas are permitted, each should be limited in size to an area that cannot contain a potentially critical buildup of forces, and their proximity to each other should be limited so that such a critical buildup could not occur in a "string" of such areas. In addition to eliminating the possibility that a potentially threatening attack force could be assembled in one or more restricted areas, such provisions limiting restricted areas would be intended to minimize the number of areas where forces and/or equipment in sufficient numbers to violate any component terms of an arms control agreement could be hidden. If either

side declares the use of restricted areas to limit challenge inspections, the nation declaring such areas should be required to admit non-aligned inspection teams to assure no treaty violations are occurring in them.

4. Discussions on strategy and doctrine

Both NATO and Pact officials during our trip recommended commencement of discussions of strategy and military doctrine involving military leaders from both sides, with the goal of eventually achieving an agreement to mutually shift from offensive to defensive postures in both of the alliances. Like CSBMs, this concept has received much attention in Europe, but as yet has not been the focus of much analysis in the United States. It is apparent that changes in U.S. doctrine—from active defense to AirLand Battle—are a matter of grave concern to the Warsaw Pact. The Pact military officers we met in Poland saw our AirLand doctrine and NATO's Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine as offensive in nature and intimidating. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Pact would like to discuss negotiated alterations in these doctrines. Similarly, NATO has long considered Pact strategies and military doctrines to be offensive in character; various alternatives could be very appealing to NATO. As previously mentioned, German doctrine seems to be in the process of some change, and articles in Soviet military journals suggest that a lively debate over doctrine is underway in the Pact countries as well.

Given all these circumstances, the time may be ripe for negotiations intended to achieve stabilizing changes in military doctrines, and it is important that NATO and the Warsaw Pact work to understand each other's strategy, that they seek to agree on a regime of indicators which discriminate routine activity from pre-mobilization and mobilization activities, and that we use the CSBMs to verify these indicators. Ultimately we can use the exchange of information on strategy and doctrine as an avenue to reduce border tension.

The recommended meetings between NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders could serve as an excellent beginning point for progress in this direction.

IV. U.S. Commitment to NATO Must Remain Unmistakably Firm

As arms control discussions go forward aimed at lowering tension along the NATO/Warsaw Pact border and eventually reducing conventional forces on both sides, they must do so against the backdrop of an unmistakably firm U.S. political and military commitment to NATO. Any unilateral reduction in U.S. military presence in Europe at this time would be counterproductive, and would jeopardize the possibility of major achievements in the areas previously outlined.

V. Miscellaneous Observations

THE "JARUZELSKI PLAN" ("MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON DECREASING ARMAMENTS AND INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE")

The so-called Jaruzelski Plan previously referenced in this report proposes to decrease weapons and increase confidence in an inner region of Central Europe including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, West and East Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Poland. Four areas for discussion are proposed:

Nuclear Arms.—Gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of nuclear weapons from the region including SNFs, nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear mines and other munitions.

Conventional Arms.—Gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of specified conventional weapons systems from the region with emphasis placed on offensive systems such as tanks, attack aircraft and helicopters, long range artillery, and multiple rocket launchers. Crews would also be removed with the weapons. The Polish officials with whom we talked expressed willingness to discuss asymmetrical reductions, but defined asymmetry as exchanging reduction of their numerical superiority in tanks for NATO reduction of its superiority in dual-capable aircraft.

Doctrine.—The plan envisions joint discussions between military experts on the nature of doctrine with the aim of achieving a mutual devolution of opposing doctrines from offensive to defensive orientations.

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.—Building on existing measures agreed to at the Stockholm Conference, the plan proposes additional talks aimed at achieving further observation and inspection arrangements, exchange of military information, and clarification of procedures designed to prevent misreading of moves by each side.

The entire text of the Plan is included as Appendix D.

IMPRESSIONS OF POLAND AND WHAT THEY MAY INDICATE ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT

The Polish economy is deeply troubled, and it appears that it would be difficult for the economies of the Eastern bloc nations, except the U.S.S.R., to sustain a well-coordinated modern war effort over any substantial period of time.

Glasnost and *perestroika,* even though not yet deeply rooted, infect the thinking and analysis of all the people with whom we met in Poland (although many felt Poland had discovered these ideas several years before General Secretary Gorbachev made them household terms).

The Poles were aggressive in defending their intellectual independence from the Soviets. They had a strong negative reaction, for example, to suggestions that they were acting as a front for the Soviets when they proposed the Jaruzelski Plan for conventional arms reductions.

The Poles, and other Eastern Europeans, are especially anxious to move forward with further arms control talks in the aftermath

of the INF Treaty. They are more interested in pursuing Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) reductions and conventional force reductions than START, which they see as principally benefitting only the United States and the Soviet Union. Their perspective derives from their history as an avenue of approach and the battleground between super powers. Everywhere we went in Poland, the memories of World War II are apparent and often strong, even 43 years after that war ended.

AN OBSERVATION ABOUT WEST GERMANY

In several conversations, the point was made that, in the event of prolonged conflict, German troops might well survive and have the capability to prosecute the war longer than the German civilian population could tolerate a war on German soil. The question of the German people's ability to survive and sustain their forces in the field suggests that it may be appropriate for the Department of Defense to seek to make a careful assessment of this situation, and review the need for stocks of various kinds of materiel in light of that assessment. U.S. forces are heavily dependent on host nation support for their own sustainability. If the Germans' will or ability to maintain necessary support falters, forward-deployed U.S. forces will be in an untenable position.

APPENDIX A

Map and Itinerary of Trip

KEY TO MAP SHOWING ITINERARY

1/ **BRUSSELS**, BELGIUM (January 5-6)
NATO
Ambassador Alton Keel, U.S. Permanent Representative, and staff
(FRG) General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman, NATO Military Committee
(U.S.) Admiral Powell F. Carter, Jr., U. S. Representative to NATO Military Committee

2/ **MONS**, BELGIUM (January 6)
SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe)
SACEUR General John R. Galvin and staff

3/ **WARSAW**, POLAND (January 6-9)
Tadeusz Olechowski, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jerzy Nowak, Director, Department of Studies and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
General Mieczyslaw Dachowski, First Deputy Chief of Staff, Polish Army
Solidarity Leaders: Zbigniew Bujak, Bronislaw Geremek, Henryk Wujec, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Jan Litynski, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik
Jozef Cardinal Glemp, Primate of Poland
Freedom and Peace Movement Leaders: Jacek Czaputowicz and Jacek Szymanderski
Ryszard Wojna, Vice Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission, Sejm (Polish Parliament)
Andrzej Karkoszka, Wojciech Multan, Longin Pastusiak, Polish Institute of International Studies
U.S. Charge d'Affaires John R. Davis and staff of U.S. Embassy
Lay Wreaths: Warsaw Ghetto Memorial
Grave of Father Popielszko

4/ **TREBLINKA**, POLAND (January 8)
Lay Wreath: Nazi Death Camp

5/ **BERLIN**, GERMANY (January 9-10)
Major General John Mitchell, U. S. Commander, Berlin
Lunch Meeting with British and French Commandants in Berlin, representatives of the ruling coalition and political opposition in the West Berlin city government
U.S. Military Liaison Mission
Field Station Berlin

6/ **PRAGUE**, CZECHOSLOVAKIA (January 10-11)
Cancelled stop when weather prohibited landing aircraft; diverted to Ramstein (U.S.) Air Force Base, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); drove to Maastricht, the Netherlands (via

Trier, FRG; Luxembourg City; Bastogne and Liege, Belgium) to resume scheduled itinerary.

7/ **MAASTRICHT**, THE NETHERLANDS (January 12)
Brigadier General John Heldstab, Commander, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) Reserve Corps (Forward)

8/ **BRUNSSUM**, THE NETHERLANDS (January 12)
POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets) weapons and equipment storage warehouses

9/ **DEBIETAL**, THE NETHERLANDS (January 12)
Warm Base Hospital

10/ **MONCHENGLADBACH**, FRG (January 12)
(British) General Sir Brian Kenny, Commander, NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and staff, and staff of 2d Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) staff

11/ **FRANKFURT**, FRG (January 12-13)
Lieutenant General John W. Woodmansee, Jr., Commander, V (U.S.) Corps and staff
Tour Hanau, Hessen Homburg, Gross-Auheim, Fliegerhorst Military Communities and their military and dependents' facilities
Patriot surface-to-air missile battery

12/ **MUNSTER**, FRG (January 13)
Lieutenant General Dieter Clauss, Commander, I (GE [West German]) Corps, and staff

13/ **HEIDELBERG**, FRG (January 13-14)
(U.S.) General Glenn K. Otis, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army/Europe (USAREUR), and staff
NATO Central Army Group (CENTAG) staff and 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF) staff

14/ **FULDA**, FRG (January 14)
(U.S.) Colonel Thomas White, Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and staff
Sickles Army Air Field
Briefings and discussions on defense of Fulda Gap
Inter German Border (IGB) Observation Post Alpha

15/ **STUTTGART**, FRG (January 14-15)
(U.S. Air Force) General Thomas C. Richards, Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command (US EUCOM), and staff

16/ **HEILBRONN**, FRG (January 15)
Camp Redleg, Pershing II INF Missile Base

17/ **RAMSTEIN (U.S.) AIR FORCE BASE**, FRG (January 15-16)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, Vice Commander, U.S. Air Forces/Europe (USAFE), and staff

Departure for U.S. from Frankfurt, FRG

APPENDIX B

Key Provisions of the INF Treaty

The following charts summarizing the systems affected by the INF Treaty, means of destroying treaty-eliminated items, and treaty verification regimen were used by Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, in the briefing USAFE provided to me. They are the best summaries of key treaty provisions I have yet encountered.


UNCLASSIFIED
KEY TREATY PROVISIONS
SYSTEMS COVERED
US
USSR
IRM
PERSHING II, GLCM
SS-20, SS-4, SS-5
SRM
PERSHING IA
SS-12, SS-23
DRAWDOWN PHASING (IRM)
- 36-MONTH DRAWDOWN PERIOD WITH 2 PHASES
-- PHASE 1: 1-29 MONTHS. EACH PARTY LIMITED TO THE NUMBER OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF HANDLING 180 WARHEADS. (PARITY)
-- PHASE 2: 30-36 MONTHS. ALL MISSILES, LAUNCHERS, SUPPORT FACILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT ELIMINATED. (GLCM HARDENED SHELTERS REMAIN INTACT).
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

KEY TREATY PROVISIONS

MEANS OF ELIMINATION

MISSILES

- EXPLOSIVE DEMOLITION (EXPLOSIVE CUTTING & BURNING)
- BURNING (STATIC FIRING)
- LAUNCH TO DESTRUCT
  - -- EACH SIDE PERMITTED 100 IRM
  - -- SOVIETS MORE LIKELY TO USE
- STATIC DISPLAY
  - -- EACH SIDE PERMITTED 15
  - -- TRAINING ITEMS MAY BE USED
- TRAINING ITEMS ELIMINATED AT END OF THREE YEARS

LAUNCHERS

- REMOVE AND DESTROY ERECTOR MECHANISM
- CUT MOUNTINGS FOR ERECTOR MECHANISM
- CUT AFT END OF CHASSIS AT PRESCRIBED LENGTHS
- TRAINING ITEMS ELIMINATED AT END OF THREE YEARS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

US NOTIONAL INSPECTION SCHEDULE

	YEAR 1	YEAR 2	YEAR 3	YEARS 4-8	YEARS 9-13
BASELINE	120	--	--	--	--
SHORT-NOTICE	20	20	20	15	10
CLOSE OUT*	20	40	40	--	--
ELIMINATION	CONSTANT ———				
PORTAL MONITORING	CONSTANT ———				
TOTAL	180	60	60	15	10

*CLOSE OUT INSPECTIONS SHOULD EQUAL BASELINE INSPECTIONS, HOWEVER, ESTIMATE 20 FACILITIES WHERE THE BASELINE INSPECTION WILL BE THE CLOSE OUT INSPECTION.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

KEY TREATY PROVISIONS

INSPECTION REGIME

- BASELINE: (60-DAY PERIOD TO VERIFY NUMBERS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS)
  - -- UP TO 10 INSPECTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY
- CLOSE OUT: (VERIFY 0)
  - -- ESTIMATE ONE-THIRD PER YEAR
- SHORT NOTICE: (MIN 16-HOUR NOTICE)
  - -- 20 INSPECTIONS FOR THE FIRST 3 YEARS
  - -- 15 INSPECTIONS FOR THE NEXT 5 YEARS
  - -- 10 INSPECTIONS FOR THE FINAL 5 YEARS
- ELIMINATION PROCESS
- CONTINUOUS PORTAL MONITORING
  - -- VOTKINSK: SS-20/SS-25 PRODUCTION
  - -- HERCULES: PII PRODUCTION
- ON-BASE INSPECTIONS LIMITED TO GAMA, MAINTENANCE, AND TRAINING FACILITIES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAWDOWN OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WARHEADS



UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX C

Statement of General Sir Brian Kenny to the Defense Committee of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany

General Sir Brian Kenny, Commander of the British Army of the Rhine, and of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), spoke to the Defense Committee of the West German Bundestag on January 13, 1988. Defense experts agree that successfully defending the NORTHAG sector of NATO operations presents a major challenge to the alliance. In his statement, General Kenny succinctly outlines the problems he faces in carrying out his mission in his multi-national NORTHAG command, and prioritizes his needs.

TALK TO DEFENSE COMMITTEE BONN

1. I am most grateful to HE The Ambassador for the privilege of saying a few words to you today.

2. I am sure that some of you will be familiar with the British TV serial called "Yes Prime Minister." A satire on political life based on the diary of Sir Humphrey Appelby. He is an archtypal Civil Servant—I hasten to say fictitious—who is Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. One of Sir Humphrey's more noted remarks is: "It is not the job of the Civil Servant to say whether a piece of Government policy is good or bad. It is normally bad, but it is the Civil Servant's role to make it look good." I am not sure whether Sir Humphrey might have extended this to include the role of the military commander, as a military civil servant—or indeed the Ambassador. Anyway to avoid tempting providence, I want to talk primarily as a NATO Commander.

3. Let me start by saying that I, and I am sure every military commander, welcome the INF Agreement with an overall reduction in nuclear weapons. I also welcome any future arms control agreements—*provided* that these agreements will lessen the tension between East and West, and *provided* they lead to greater international stability. Nuclear weapons will continue to be essential to maintain a credible and cost effective deterrence. And, in pursuing further Arms Control Agreements, we must therefore examine the case for modernisation of our remaining theatre nuclear weapons and, at the same time, do what we can to improve the combat effectiveness of our conventional forces which is very much my concern. I would like to give you a few thoughts on how this combat effectiveness of NORTHAG might be improved and therefore make the most effective contribution towards deterrence.

4. I would remind you, that as COMNORTHAG, I initially command 4 Corps coming from 4 different Nations, 5 when the AG receives the vital reinforcing Corps from the US. I should point out that CENTAG is a little different with 4 Corps from 2 different Nations—the USA and FRG [or I suppose 3 Nations if you include the Bavarians!] And of course they also get support from Canada and perhaps France. So we *are* different.

5. The joint NORTHAG/2ATAF HQ is the decisive command level for the planning and conduct of the land/air battle. Within NORTHAG, over the past 2 years, we have taken some significant steps forward to improve our operational effectiveness. We now have one fully integrated AG Concept and General Defence Plan, which transcends National Corps boundaries. As AG Commander, I can make maximum use of our collective resources, switching formations or weapons systems between National Corps, and creating reserves to meet my operational objective as the battle develops. 2 years ago this simply would not have been so easy to achieve. We have therefore made real progress which is reflected in the joint training that is carried out. For example, Exercise CERTAIN STRIKE last year included participation from all 5 nations. But really the only way we can further improve operational effectiveness is by breaking down some of the existing National barriers to inter-

operability and standardisation of equipment. Let me give you some examples of the situations I face:

a. When NORTHAG deploys, each Corps will bring its own tactical communications system (ZODIAC, Autoco, Ptarmigan, RITA). None of these are interoperable with each other or indeed with NATO communications, which means I have great difficulty exercising command of my AG. We must now spend a considerable amount of money on achieving an interface.

b. We have 5 different tanks with 4 different calibres of gun. In the foreseeable future we will still have 3 different calibres with varying types of ammunition, which means no commonality of spares and an inability to help each other over ammunition.

c. There are 4 different anti-tank helicopters with different anti-tank missiles. If current national plans are developed this is likely to increase to 5.

d. Our infantrymen across the AG carry 5 different types of rifle each with different ammunition.

e. In my own HQ, if I put everybody into their NBC suit and gas mask, I see in front of me 4 different types. My German Chief Of Staff and all the other German Staff would die quickly. Of the remainder, 3 would claim that his MOD assured him that his equipment was the best.

f. Logistics is a National responsibility and we therefore have 5 different lines of communication. When a formation from one Corps operates in another Corps area, which is fundamental to our concept, it must therefore set up its own logistic chain including medical evacuation.

g. As you know, the reinforcing US Corps has its equipment prestocked in the NORTHAG area. Almost without exception this equipment is different from the in-theatre Corps of NORTHAG. If the US Corps is delayed, we would then have considerable difficulty in manning this equipment.

6. Of course this is not new. And I would remind you that General Goodpaster when he was SACEUR some years ago estimated that NATO capabilities were diminished by 40% due to non-standardisation of equipment and lack of interoperability. Indeed our own Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and your Chancellor Helmut Kohl in their joint visit to the Bundeswehr and the British Army in September 86 deliberately stressed the importance of standardisation of equipment.

7. Lord Carrington last year said "I sometimes think the Soviet Union and its allies look at the way we in the West procure conventional military equipment and can hardly believe their luck". He went on to stress the need for much greater Allied cooperation and quoted the example of 16 industrial companies in 7 countries all working on air-to-ground systems.

8. It is also indisputable that considerable resources and personnel could be saved from the National logistic chains if we had common ammunition, spares etc.

9. That may paint a somewhat black picture. In terms of equipment collaboration, there have of course been some success stories. The Tornado, and the Milan and in the future hopefully MLRS and TRIGAT. But let us not forget the sad story of the SP 70 project, and agreements over helicopters. All Nations are currently spending more and buying less at a time when Quantity takes on a Quality with a capital Q of its own, in the face of an increasing WP superiority.

10. We must do more but what? First I think that NATO operational commanders must flex their muscles more and be much more positive in stating interoperability requirements and priorities for standardisation. It is not enough just to state NATO Force Goals which are then reflected in *national* capability gaps which in turn lead to independently derived *national* equipment plans. We should in parallel highlight our interoperability gaps and standardisation goals. By presenting our requirements in such a way, National MODs would have to take full account of them, and show the degree to which they would or would not be met. But of course we must be realistic rather than idealistic. For example, we might achieve common tank ammunition across all the 4 National Corps by the year 2000, but a common tank is simply not feasible before the year 2010. Similarly we should state a requirement for a common air-to-ground anti-tank missile before the end of the Century rather than aiming for a common helicopter. The same would apply to the rifle.

11. There is another area where I see possible scope. Modern technology is generally very expensive. A follow-on to Lance, and survelliance and target acquisition devices are examples. I question whether these need to be held by each Corps. Could we not more cost effectively develop these as mulitnational Army Group weapon systems rather than leaving individual National Corps to develop their own independent systems? It might well be better and cheaper to have an internationally funded system organic to the Army Group, which would save enormous R&D costs. Perhaps AWACS is a good example of what can be achieved.

12. Too often we see Nations determined, at all costs, to produce their own piece of equipment insisting that it must meet 100% of their own individual national requirements. This normally not only leads to delays but almost certainly to additional costs and a lack of interoperability with other Nations. Another Nation may well be able to offer a similar piece of equipment in a shorter timescale but which may only meet 90% of the requirement. But I would suggest that this last 10% of the requirement is a small price to pay to achieve a higher degree of interoperability and therefore operational effectiveness. When a Nation chooses to introduce new equipment, which does not meet the interoperability requirement, a NATO commander must at least make his views clear. These may well be ignored, but on the other hand a Nation could find these useful in justifying a decision which is internally unpopular.

13. Of course none of this is easy to achieve, but, where there is a will, there is a way. Unfortunately at the moment I am not convinced that there is a will. Too often National interests in terms of finance and industry prevail over the strictly military requirement. We are only going to make progress in equipment standardisation if we have NATO or perhaps European operational requirements staff with some power, backed by a larger European or NATO equipment budget. We would also need a NATO R&D organization which would help to eliminate the enormous amount of money spent on overlapping research and development projects. You are all much better qualified than I to suggest how our national industrial interests can be catered for.

14. Let me finish where I began. All of us in the Central Region will be fighting the same war against a common enemy. We in NORTHAG have gone a long way in terms of interoperability of training, and doctrine. We now have a harmonised concept which relies on exploiting all the available resources across boundaries, something very much recognised in the Long Term Planning for the Bundeswehr. We have gone as far as we can, and can only really achieve further progress by breaking down National barriers to equipment interoperability.

APPENDIX D

TEXT OF THE "MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON DECREASING ARMAMENTS AND INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE" (THE "JARUZELSKI ARMS CONTROL PLAN")

The Polish Foreign Ministry provided the English translation of the complete text of the so-called "Jaruzelski Plan." Although the proposal received brief coverage in the U.S. press when presented in late 1987, it has not received careful attention on this side of the Atlantic; Europeans are more familiar with it. The Polish government intended its proposal as a catalyst for further discussion concerning what components should be contained in an arms control agenda focusing on the balance of forces in Europe.

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON DECREASING ARMAMENTS AND INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The Government of the Polish People's Republic reiterates its will to contribute substantively to efforts leading to disarmament and the strengthening of international security, particularly in Central Europe, as evidenced in its previous initiatives. It is in Central Europe that the two political and military groupings are in direct contact; it is also here that the greatest concentration of military potential in the world exists. The situation in this region weighs particularly heavily on the security of all States on this continent as well as of those States whose security interests are closely linked with it.

In the past, the Government of the Polish People's Republic has presented a number of proposals, the purpose of which was to restrain the arms race in Europe and to create conditions which would lead to more comprehensive disarmament measures. These included the 1957 plan to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone and the 1964 plan envisaging a freeze of nuclear armaments, both concerning Central Europe. For many years these plans were continually subject of the international dialogue and contributed to the search for solutions which would enhance security in Europe and in the world.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic presents the view that the shape of political, economic, and cultural relations in Europe, which has developed particularly in the wake of the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, renders the present high level of armaments and military preparedness in Europe unwarranted. The Polish Government is convinced that conditions exist at present to initiate steps which would assure the European States undiminished and equal security at a considerably lower level of military potential. The outcome of such steps would be to diminish the still existing danger of a military conflict breaking out in Europe, and particularly to prevent the possibility of a surprise attack. These steps, if taken, would contribute to establishing common security in Europe, through cooperation and by taking the interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into greater consideration.

Taking the above premises as its starting point the Government of the Polish People's Republic submits herewith a Plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe. It covers the territories of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Polish People's Republic, together with their territorial waters and airspace.

The Plan envisages:

1. The gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of specified, mutually agreed kinds and quantities of nuclear weapons. Such undertakings would encompass all kinds of nuclear weapons, as long as they are not subject of other agreements, in particular such weapons as: operational and tactical missiles, particularly those up to 500 km range; nuclear artillery; nuclear-capable aircraft; also any type of nuclear charges,

including nuclear mines and bombs. All these should be reviewed bearing into consideration measures related to the withdrawal and reduction of conventional weapons.

2. The gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of specified mutually agreed kinds and quantities of conventional weapons. The first to be considered being weapons of the greatest destructive power and accuracy which could be employed in offensive operations including surprise attacks, for example, strike aircraft; tanks; armed helicopters; long-range artillery, including rocket artillery. An exchange of the lists of weapons considered by each State to be particularly threatening and offensive might prove helpful.

These measures could find substantiation by withdrawing the weapons with their crews from the zone envisaged by the Plan, by destroying those weapons or by withdrawing them from operational military stockpiles with the aim to convert them to peaceful purpose or to place them in internationally controlled storage premises.

3. Joint actions which would ensure such an evolution of the nature of military doctrines that they could reciprocally be assessed as being strictly defensive. To achieve this the doctrines would have to be based on the principle of adequacy which would justify the possession by a State only of such a military potential as is indispensable for effective defence. A joint discussion and comparison of military concepts and doctrines and an analysis of their nature and development trends could prove helpful.

4. Agreement on appropriate far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures and the mechanisms for the strict verification of compliance with the undertaken commitments, including such which for various reasons it would be difficult to introduce to Europe as a whole.

Such measures would be complementary to those already in existence and could envisage, inter alia, an agreement on parameters to constrain the size and/or the intensity of the specified types of military activities (for example, exercises and concentrations of forces on the respective territories), the exchange of military information, procedures for the prompt clarification of situations arousing the concern of either side. The efforts of the States should also be aimed at bringing the independent activities of air and naval forces within the framework of confidence- and security-building measures.

To ensure that the accepted measures are effectively implemented an appropriate system of verification would be established. It would encompass means of national and international control mutually accepted as effective, including observation and on-site inspection. An international institution(s) of control could be established, with the participation of the States concerned and others. The control mechanism might visualize, inter alia, an exchange of information indispensable for effective verification; notification of the commencement and completion of the withdrawal or reduction of armaments and their observation; establishment of control points on the borders of the zone through which the arms would be withdrawn, as well as at large railway junctions, airfields, seaports, and other measures. A procedure of bilateral and multilateral consultations could be included in this system.

On its part the Government of the Polish People's Republic expresses its readiness to accept, on a reciprocal basis, any method of control indispensable to attain the purposes of the Plan.

The nuclear powers would issue appropriate agreed quarantees to ensure the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in the Plan, the security of States included in the zone, and that the status established by the agreement be respected.

In presenting this Plan, the Government of Poland assumes as purposeful to negotiate and introduce parallely and stage-by-stage disarmament measures in Europe, depending on their substance, procedure and time, in three territorial realms, that is in a corridor on both sides of the line of contact of the two opposing politico-military groupings, in Central Europe and in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Plan dovetails aptly with other propositions related to the above mentioned territorial realms, including the 1986 Budapest Appeal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the intiative of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic relative to a corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The measures proposed in the Plan constitute a mutually supplemental entity. Nevertheless each of its postulates may be negotiated and implemented separately and in stages with regard to territorial scope, as well as their stated subjects and objects.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic accepts that the zone of application visualized by the Plan could, with time, be enlarged through the access of other European States, including neutral and non-aligned States.

The substance of the Plan could be the subject of the negotiations currently being held or to be held in the future within the framework of or in connection with the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Decisions on the withdrawal and reduction of the kinds of weapons mentioned in the Plan would be accompanied by a consent not to substitute them with new designs of weapons and equipment or those obtained by conversion as well as not to introduce entirely new kinds of weapons with particularly offensive characteristics.

Another issue on which agreement could be sought is that of historically formed disproportions and asymmetries in particular kinds of weapons and military forces, together with ways to eradicate them through a reduction to an agreed level by the side which possesses the superiority.

The assumed measures would be based on the principles of equality of rights and security of all parties, balance and reciprocity and would be taken without detriment to the security of any State.

Warsaw, July 17, 1987.

APPENDIX E

"Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe . . ." September 19, 1986

In September, 1986, 35 sovereign nations and the Vatican reached agreement on an unprecedented regime of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) which came to be known as "the Stockholm Agreement." The CSBMs which the agreement established have been in effect, and apparently operating as designed, for over a year. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact leaders have suggested the desirability of expanding and building on this regime of CSBMs. This appendix is the full text of the formal executive agreement from the Stockholm Conference.

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

On Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

(1) The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE.

(2) The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof Palme, on 17 January 1984.

(3) Opening statements were made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads of Delegation. The Prime Minister of Spain as well as Ministers and senior officials of several other participating States addressed the Conference later. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden addressed the Conference on 19 September 1986.

(4) The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed the Conference on 6 July 1984.

(5) Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

(6) The participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.

(7) The participating States recognized that the set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which are adopted in the present document and which are in accordance with the Madrid mandate serve by their scope and nature and by their implementation to strengthen confidence and security in Europe and thus to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.

(8) Consequently the participating States have declared the following:

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

(9) The participating States, recalling their obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, accordingly reaffirm their commitment to respect and put into practice the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, as laid down in the Final Act.

(10) No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

(11) They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

(12) They will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing any other State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

(13) As set forth in the Final Act, no occupation or acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law, will be recognized as legal.

(14) They recognize their commitment to peace and security. Accordingly they reaffirm that they will refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

(15) They will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any State, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that State relations of alliance.

(16) They stress that non-compliance with the obligation of refraining from the threat or use of force, as recalled above, constitutes a violation of international law.

(17) They stress their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security. They recall their determination and the necessity to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reaffirm their resolve to make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them.

(18) The participating States stress their commitment to the Final Act and the need for full implementation of all its provisions, which will further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

(19) They emphasize their commitment to all the principles of the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States and declare their determination to respect and put them into practice irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development.

(20) All these ten principles are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

(21) Respect for and the application of these principles will enhance the development of friendly relations and co-operation among the participating States in all fields covered by the provisions of the Final Act.

(22) They reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States and stress that all States have equal rights and duties within the framework of international law.

(23) They reaffirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Respect for and the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms are essential factors for international peace, justice and security, as well as for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States, as set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.

(24) They reaffirm that, in the broader context of world security, security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole; in this context, they confirm their intention to develop good neighbourly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in

the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act.

(25) They emphasize the necessity to take resolute measures to prevent and to combat terrorism, including terrorism in international relations. They express their determination to take effective measures, both at the national level and through international co-operation, for the prevention and suppression of all acts of terrorism. They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities, including subversive activities, of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, including those directed against other States and their citizens.

(26) They will fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law; they also stress that strict compliance with their commitments within the framework of the CSCE is essential for building confidence and security.

(27) The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(28) The participating States have adopted the following measures:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(29) The participating States will give notification in writing through diplomatic channels in an agreed form of content, to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable [1] military activities in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).[2]

(30) Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.

(31) Each of the following military activities in the field conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below, will be notified.

(31.1) The engagement of formations of land forces [3] of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

(31.1.1) This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity: At least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or at least 300 battle tanks, and if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

(31.1.2) The participation of air forces of the participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.

(31.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(31.2.1) These military activities will be subject to notification whenever the amphibious landing involves at least 3,000 troops or whenever the parachute drop involves at least 3,000 troops.

(31.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.

(31.3.1) The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves, at any time during the activity: At least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or at least 300 battle tanks, and if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

(31.3.2) Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBMs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a

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[1] In this document, the term notifiable means subject to notification.

[2] See Annex I.

[3] In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(22) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

(32.1) Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

(33) Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:

(34) **A—General Information**

(34.1) The designation of the military activity;

(34.2) The general purpose of the military activity;

(34.3) The names of the States involved in the military activity;

(34.4) The level of command, organizing and commanding the military activity;

(34.5) The start and end dates of the military activity.

(35) **B—Information on different types of notifiable military activities**

(35.1) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:

(35.1.1) The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable;

(35.1.2) Number and type of divisions participating for each State;

(35.1.3) The total number of battle tanks for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted or armoured vehicles;

(35.1.4) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above);

(35.1.5) The total number of helicopters, by category;

(35.1.6) Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters;

(35.1.7) Purpose of air missions;

(35.1.8) Categories of aircraft involved;

(35.1.9) The level of command and commanding the air force participation;

(35.1.10) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;

(35.1.11) Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support;

(35.1.12) The level of command, organizing and commanding the naval force participation.

(35.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs:

(35.2.1) The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of airborne troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults;

(35.2.2) In the case of a notifiable amphibious landing, the point or points or embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(35.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

(35.3.1) The total number of troops transferred;

(35.3.2) Number and type of divisions participating in the transfer;

(35.3.3) The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;

(35.3.4) Geographical co-ordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration.

(36) **C—The envisaged area and timeframe of the activity**

(36.1) The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate;

(36.2) The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of activities in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical co-ordinates) for each phase;

(36.3) Brief description of each phase.

(37) **D—Other information**

(37.1) Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity;

(37.2) Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities.

OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(38) The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:

(38.1) The engagement of formations of land forces [4] of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

(38.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(38.3) In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(38.4) The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 17,000 troops, except in the case of either an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces, which will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.

(39) The host State will extend the invitations in writing through diplomatic channels to all other participating States at the time of notification. The host State will be the participating State or whose territory the notified activity will take place.

(40) The host State may delegate some of its responsibilities as host to another participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.

(41) Each participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed.

(42) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including members of its personnel accredited to the host State. Military observers will, normally, wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.

(43) Replies to the invitation will be given in writing not later than 21 days after the issue of the invitation.

(44) The participating States accepting an invitation will provide the names and ranks of their observers in their reply to the invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in time, it will be assumed that no observers will be sent.

(45) Together with the invitation the host State will provide a general observation programme including the following information:

(45.1) The date, time and place of assembly of observers;

(45.2) Planned duration of the observation programme.

(45.3) Languages to be used in interpretation and/or translation.

(45.4) Arrangements for board, lodging and transportation of the observers.

(45.5) Arrangements for observation equipment which will be issued to the observers by the host State.

(45.6) Possible authorization by the host State of the use of special equipment that the observers may bring with them.

(45.7) Arrangements for special clothing to be issued to the observers because of weather or environmental factors.

(46) The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host State will, if possible, accede to them.

(47) The host State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.

(48) The host State will provide the observers with transportation to the area of the notified activity and back. This transportation will be provided from either the capital or another suitable location to be announced in the invitation, so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme.

(49) The invited State will cover the travel expenses for its observers to the capital, or another suitable location specified in the invitation, of the host State, and back.

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[4] In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

(50) The observers will be provided equal treatment and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.

(51) The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(52) The host State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.

(53) In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host State will:

(53.1) At the commencement of the observation programme give a briefing on the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification and provide the observers with a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of 1 to not more than 500,000 and an observation programme with a daily schedule as well as a sketch indicating the basic situation;

(53.2) Provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; however, the observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, which will be subject to examination and approved by the host State;

(53.3) In the course of the observation programme give the observers daily briefings with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development and inform the observers about their positions geographically; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of these forces.

(53.4) Provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State/States engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe major combat units of the participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit some units and communicate with commanders and troops; commanders or other senior personnel of participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission of their respective units.

(53.5) Guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document.

(53.6) Provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity.

(53.7) Provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their embassies or other official missions and consider posts; the host State is not obligated to cover the communication expense of the observers.

(53.8) Provide the observers with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation programme and, when necessary, medical care.

(54) The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this document.

ANNUAL CALENDARS

(55) Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification,[5] within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. It will be transmitted every year, in writing, through diplomatic channels, not later than 15 November for the following year.

(56) Each participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:

(56.1) Type of military activity and its designation.

(56.2) General characteristics and purpose of the military activity.

(56.3) States involved in the military activity.

(56.4) Area of the military activity, indicated by appropriate geographic features and/or defined by geographic co-ordinates.

(56.5) Planned duration of the military activity and the 14-day period, indicated by dates, within which it is envisaged to start.

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[5] As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

(56.6) The envisaged total number of troops [6] engaged in the military activity.
(56.7) The types of armed forces involved in the military activity.
(56.8) The envisaged level of command, under which the military activity will take place.
(56.9) The number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged.
(56.10) Any additional information concerning, *inter alia*, components of armed forces, which the participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.
(57) Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.
(58) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

(59) Each participating State will communicate, in writing, to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification * involving more than 40,000 troops *, which it plans to carry out in the second subsequent calendar year. Such communication will include preliminary information on each activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.
(60) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 75,000 troops, unless they have been the object of communication as defined above.
(61) Participating State will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.
(62) If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

(63) According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content."
(64) The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.
(65) In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.
(66) Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State on whose territory, within the zone of application for CSBMs, compliance with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures is in doubt.
(67) No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.
(68) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.
(69) An inspection will not be counted if, due to *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out.
(70) The participating State which requests an inspection will state the reasons for such a request.
(71) The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs (67) and (68).
(72) Any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons for a request will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.
(73) The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area". The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is

[6] As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army level military activity.

(74) In the specified area the representatives of the inspecting State accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defense installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.

(75) Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection conducted by the inspecting State.

(76) Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.

(77) The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and an aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.

(78) In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:

(78.1) The reasons for the request.

(78,2) The location of the specified area defined by geographical co-ordinates;

(78.3) The preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;

(78.4) Mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the specified area.

(78.5) Where in the specified area the inspection will begin.

(78.6) Whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously.

(78.7) Whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both.

(78.8) Whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles.

(78.9) Information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.

(79) The reply to the request will be given in the shortest period of time, but within not more than twenty-four hours. Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.

(80) Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all participating States without delay.

(81) The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry.

(82) All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.

(83) Within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.

(84) There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. While conducting the inspection the inspection team may divide into two parts.

(85) The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel, will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(86) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.

(87) The inspection team will have use of its own maps, own photo cameras, own binoculars and own dictaphones, as well as own aeronautical charts.

(88) The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State, including the opportunity for continuous communication between the members of an inspection team in an aircraft and those in a land vehicle employed in the inspection.

(89) The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by

mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team a continuous view of the ground during the inspection.

(90) After the flight plan, specifying *inter alia*, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph (74) as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.

(91) One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.

(92) Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired withint the 48-hour inspection period.

(93) The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross country capability. Whenever mutually agreed taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.

(94) If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.

(95) The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States without delay.

(96) The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State except when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry will be borne by the inspecting State.

(97) Diplomatic channels will be used for communications concerning compliance and verification.

(98) Each participating State will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.

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(99) The participating States stress that these confidence- and security-building measures are designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and emphasize that their implementation will contribute to these objectives.

(100) Reaffirming the relevant objectives of the Final Act, the participating States are determined to continue building confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all. They are also determined to achieve progress in disarmament.

(101) The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1987.

(102) The Government of Sweden is requested to trasmit the present document to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in Vienna and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Government of Sweden is also requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.

(103) The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possibly.

(104) The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the Government and people of Sweden for the excellent arrangements made for the Stockholm Conference and the warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Conference.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986.

ANNEX I

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

> "On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarma-

ment in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area [7] and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area [7] and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

Wherever the term "the zone of application for CSBMs" is used in this document, the above definition will apply.

ANNEX II

Chairman's Statement

It is understood that, taking into account the agreed date of entry into force of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures and the provisions contained in them concerning the timeframes of certain advance notifications, and expressing their interest in an early transition to the full implementation of the provisions of this document, the participating States agree to the following:

The annual calendars concerning military activities subject to prior notification and forecast for 1987 will be exchanged not later than 15 December 1986.

Communications, in accordance with agreed provisions, concerning military activities involving more than 40,000 troops planned for the calendar year 1988 will be exchanged by 15 December 1986. Participating States may undertake activities involving more than 75,000 troops during the calendar year 1987 provided that they are included in the annual calendar exchanged by 15 December 1986.

Activities to begin during the first 42 days after 1 January 1987 will be subject to the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE. However, the participating States will make every effort to apply to them the provisions of this document to the maximum extent possible.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986.

ANNEX III

Chairman's Statement

It is understood that each participating State can raise any question consistent with the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe at any stage subsequent to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986.

ANNEX IV

Chairman's Statement

It is understood that the participating States recall that they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right of neutrality. In this context, they will not take advantage of these rights to circumvent the purposes of the system of in-

[7] In the context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."

spection, and in particular the provision that no participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

Appropriate understandings between participating States on this subject will be expressed in interpretative statements to be included in the journal of the day.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986.

APPENDIX F

"Analysis Report: The Clash Between Civilian Specialists and the Soviet Military Over 'Reasonable Sufficiency'" by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Evidence is increasing that serious discussions are underway between Soviet military theorists and political scientists concerning a possible redefinition of the size and composition of military forces needed to provide for the defense of the U.S.S.R. Such a redefinition, should it occur, could dramatically affect the Soviets' posture concerning the conventional balance and conventional arms control. The discussions appear to focus on a concept which some have termed "reasonable sufficiency," which involves mutual reduction of armaments to the point where neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact would possess the means of launching a surprise attack or conducting offensive operations against the other.

European military analysts and some U.S. specialists are aware of this debate within Soviet political and military circles and are seeking to assess its significance and outcome. The following analysis prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service describes what is being observed and discusses the possible significance.

ANALYSIS REPORT

The Clash Between Civilian Specialists and the Soviet Military Over "Reasonable Sufficiency"

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

INTRODUCTION

In an apparent effort to counter objections from the military to arms control initiatives and defense cuts, the Gorbachev regime has enlisted the aid of civilian foreign affairs experts to argue the case for change in national security policy. In recent months these specialists from prestigious think tanks have clashed directly with the military over the definition of "reasonable sufficiency," a concept that, judging from what the civilians are saying, appears designed to strengthen the rationale for Soviet arms control initiatives and reduced military spending. The debate so far has centered on three issues:

Quality versus quantity.—The civilians argue that military parity should be evaluated not according to a strict quantitative definition that requires matching the potential adversary weapon for weapon but by "qualitative" criteria that would permit the USSR to reduce its level of forces and respond asymmetrically to new arms developments in the West. The generals continue to defend a stricter, or more quantitative definition of parity and to deny the admissibility of unilateral or asymmetrical responses.

Intentions versus capabilities.—The civilians contend that an adversary's intentions should be considered, in addition to his military capability, when calculating the level of military force needed for security. They add that an interest in self-preservation makes it unlikely that the West would launch a nuclear war. The generals allege that the risk of war remains high because the adversary remains aggressive and determined to upset the military balance and achieve superiority.

Political versus military means.—Following the lead of General Secretary Gorbachev, the civilians call for achieving security through political means, such as negotiation, rather than by increasing military strength. Although the generals pay lip-service to the theoretical desirability of political means, they argue that these are not reliable and their use could lead to a dangerous neglect of the essential element of security—a strong defense.

Given the high stakes involved, the military's objections to sufficiency could become a weapon in the hands of conservative leaders concerned over the scope and

pace of Gorbachev's political and economic restructuring. The military and conservatives within the party might join forces in an attempt to defeat Gorbachev's reforms. If the civilians win the debate, however, Gorbachev will have succeeded in laying the doctrinal basis for further steps in arms control and cuts in military spending that could free up resources badly needed to restructure the civilian economy.

THE CLASH BETWEEN CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS AND THE SOVIET MILITARY OVER "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY"

The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" was given its first detailed exposition in Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress. Gorbachev broke with his predecessors on the question of nuclear parity by arguing that Soviet security depends not on maintaining strategic parity with the West, but more importantly on reducing the nuclear balance on both sides, which he described as "inoridnately high." Rejecting the standard formulation on parity, he asserted that without reductions in nuclear arsenals, "even parity will cease to be a factor in military and political restraint." Gorbachev emphasized the need for new, political means of ensuring security and proposed the creation of a "comprehensive" system of international security, one of whose fundamental principles would be a "strictly verified reduction in the levels of military potentials of states to a reasonable sufficiency" (*Pravda*, 26 February 1986).

Little more was said about sufficiency or its implications until Gorbachev again raised the issue in his speech to the trade union congress on 25 February 1987. On that occasion, Gorbachev went beyond his remarks at the party congress, clearly suggesting that under a sufficiency doctrine the USSR might accept less than the strictest quantitative parity with U.S. military forces. The United States, he said, is intent on "preventing the implementation of our plans for transformation . . . slowing them down and foiling them by the arms race." Gorbachev avowed that the USSR will not "take a single step" beyond the requirements of a "reasonable, sufficient defense," refusing to "repeat thoughtlessly and automatically whatever the imperialists may strive to impose upon us in the arms race" (*Pravda*, 26 February 1987).

Although the concept still remained largely undefined, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at its 28–29 May meeting issued a declaration on military doctrine that endorsed sufficiency in terms that adhered closely to Gorbachev's formulation at the party congress (*Pravda*, 31 May 1987). According to the declaration, the Pact members affirmed their commitment to the "prime duty" of protecting their peoples by maintaining a "sufficiency of defense" for "rebutting possible aggression." The Pact members declared that while "military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor for preventing war," they have no desire for "armed forces or armaments in excess of what is necessary for these purposes."

KEY GORBACHEV STATEMENTS ON SUFFICIENCY

To the Supreme Soviet (*Pravda*, 28 November 1985):

*. . . [The USSR and the United States] will have to reach a common understanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient (*otnositelno dostatochnyy*), from the point of view of its reliable defense. We are convinced that the level of this sufficiency is much lower than that which the USSR and the United States in fact possess at the moment. This means that weighty practical steps for the limitation and reduction of weapons are perfectly possible, measures that not only will not lessen. but will strengthen security both for the USSR and the United States, and the entire strategic stability of th world.*

To the 27th CPSU Congress (*Pravda*, 26 February 1986):

*. . . Our country stands for . . . restricting military potentials within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency (*razumnaya dostatochnost*). But the nature and limits of those bounds continue to be limited by the positions and actions of the United States and its bloc partners.*

The nature of today's weapons leaves no state any hope of defending itself with military-technical means alone. . . . Ensuring security is more and more taking the form of a political task, and it can only be solved by political means.

Security, when one speaks of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, can only be mutual, and if one considers international relations as a whole, it can only be universal. The highest wisdom is not in worrying only about oneself, or, all the more, about damaging the other side; it is necessary for all to feel that they are equally secure . . . .

To the trade union congress (*Pravda*, 26 February 1987):

> *. . . Now when the opponent's gamble on our backwardness has taken a serious shaking, imperialism is switching the emphasis on to something else; preventing the implementation of our plans for transformation, hindering them, slowing them down, and foiling them by the arms race. . . . Our response is clear. We have done and will continue to do everything that is necessary to reliably safeguard our security. . . . But we will not take a single step over and above the demands and requirements of reasonable, sufficient defense* (razumnaya, dostatochnaya oborona). *We will not repeat thoughtlessly and automatically whatever the imperialists may strive to impose upon us in the arms race.*

Perhaps sensing military resistance to Gorbachev's concept of sufficiency and unable to count on military theorists to support it, senior party Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev—a close ally of Gorbachev with direct ties to civilian thinkers—broached the idea of civilian foreign policy specialists entering the discussion of Soviet national security policy in a May issue of the authoritative party journal *Kommunist* (No. 8, 1987). Yakovlev sharply criticized Soviet social scientists for their timidity in exploring unresolved policy issues, accusing them of "fear of getting involved with problems that are not yet part of political decisions." He challenged them specifically to undertake "in conjunction witrh the military specialists" analysis of military doctrine and, in particular, to develop and "fill with substance" Gorbachev's new concept of reasonable sufficiency.

Yakovlev's former colleagues in the Academy of Sciences foreign affairs institutes wasted little time in responding to his invitation, spelling out a case for sufficiency that deemphasized quantitative factors in defining military parity, stressed an adversary's intentions as well as his military capability, and argued that political rather than military means best ensured national security. Unsurprisingly, the civilian views have met on each count determined opposition from top military officials, who obviously fear that if the civilian definition of sufficiency is accepted, serious cuts in resources may await the military.

Quality versus quantity

Yevgeniy Primakov, Yakovlev's successor as director of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations and candidate member of the Central Committee, was among the first to take up the case for Gorbachev's doctrine of sufficiency. Speaking on Soviet television on 4 June, he argued that, rather than matching potential adversaries in both the quality and quantity of weapons, the USSR need only ensure a "qualitative" parity, which he defined as the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on an aggressor in response to a nuclear first strike.[1]

Three members of the USA Institute—Deputy Director Vitaliy Zhurkin, section head Sergey Karaganov, and senior researcher Andrey Kortunov—subsequently pressed for acceptance of the new defense doctrine. In an article in *New Times* (12 October), they argued that the USSR's security does not depend upon imitating every move by the other side. "Copying various armaments developed and deployed by the aggressor," they wrote, is a "natural" means of preventing violations of parity, but it incorporates significant disadvantages. It ensures that the "contest" is played on the "opponent's field" according to his rules. Moreover, copying the opponent's military technology results in "lagging behind in the arms race," increasingly so as weapons become more sophisticated and take longer to develop, test, and deploy. An asymmetrical response, they pointed out, not only avoids these disadvantages, it creates problems for the other side. This, they added, is exactly what occurred when the USSR wisely refused to be drawn into a competition with the United States in the development of manned bombers in the 1950's and instead gave the United States an "unpleasant surprise" by concentrating efforts on developing ICBM's.

Military spokesmen have strongly disagreed with these arguments, especially the key implications underlying the doctrine of sufficiency, denying in particular the advisability of asymmetrical responses and unilateral reductions. The generals continue to insist that Soviet security depends on adherence to a strict definition of parity and that any steps away from the existing level of parity must be taken bilaterally, not unilaterally. Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov seems to endorse the concept of sufficiency in general terms. At the same time, however, in an apparent effort to avoid unduly antagonizing the military establishment, he has stopped short of approving the principles of asymmetrical responses or unilateral departures from parity.[2] Yazov acknowledged that in adopting sufficiency as its official doctrine the

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[1] Earlier statements by Primakov on sufficiency are discussed in the *trends* of 10 June, page 8.
[2] Yazov's views on sufficiency are discussed in the *Trends* of 29 July, pages 9–10.

Warsaw Pact member states propose force reductions, stipulating that such reductions would "of course" take place "on a mutual basis." Yazov defended parity as "the decisive factor" in preventing war and appeared to defend the traditional military view that Soviet strategic forces cannot remain static but must continue to grow in proportion to the size of opposing forces. Sticking to a formulation used by Gorbachev at the party congress, Yazov asserted that "we are not the ones who set the limits of sufficiency, it is the actions of the United States and NATO" (Pravda, 27 July).

Other high-ranking officers have rebutted the civilians in more direct fashion. First Deputy Minister of Defense Petr Lushev seconded Yazov's views on parity and discounted the possibility of adopting asymmetrical force postures, maintaining that the Soviet armed forces must "master all the forms and techniques of armed struggle that the enemy may use" (International Affairs, No. 9, 1987). Lushev quoted Lenin to drive home the point that any army that fails to "train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses or may possess" is behaving in an "unwise or even criminal manner." Col. Gen. Vladimir Rodin, member of the Military Council and head of the Strategic Rocket Forces Political Directorate, has also argued for taking "all possible measures" to ensure that "quantitative and qualitative" parity is not violated, thus directly rebutting Primakov's assertion that maintenance of quantitative parity is no longer essential.

Intentions versus capability

Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov have also argued that a more careful assessment of an adversary's intention to make war—not only his "hypothetical potential" to make war—is necessary to calculate better what level of defense is sufficient. Izvestiya political commentator Aleksandr Bovin went even further when he seemed to suggest in an 8 November Moscow News article that the traditional Soviet assessment of the West's intentions—its determination to wage war to eliminate socialism—might itself be wrong. He argued that in the nuclear age a desire for self-preservation "sharply reduces chances of the [West's] starting a deliberate nuclear war against socialism . . . because the first to start the war will be the second to die."

Statements by the military indicate that they remain unconvinced by such arguments and continue to describe the West as wedded to military means and warlike intentions. The Strategic Rocket Forces chief, Army Gen. Yuriy Maksimov, recently stated that the world situation remains "explosive through the fault of the most aggressive militarist forces of imperialism" (Soviet television, 19 November). He added that the United States and NATO are building up armaments, "seeking to upset the existing military-strategic parity." Lushev has warned of the "growing aggressiveness of imperialism" that reveals itself in attempts by the United States and the NATO countries to "shatter" the existing balance of forces and achieve superiority (Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 6). In his September International Affairs article, Lushev even claimed that a "buildup" of defense capability is a "sacred duty" in view of the "adventurism" and "threat of war posed by aggressive imperialist forces."

Political versus military means

The civilian analysts have also asserted that security is best ensured today through political measures such as bilateral and multilateral negotiations rather than through military buildings. Echoing Gorbachev's remarks to the party congress about the primacy of political means for ensuring security, Novosti chief Valentin Falin, for instance, stated in Moscow News (No. 45, 8 November) that the problem of security has become "mostly political and its military solution is becoming increasingly inappropriate." Noting that the world today is "one and interdependent," Falin maintained that security can only be "general" and, where it concerns the United States and the Soviet Union, "mutual." Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov claim that the state that relies exclusively on military means "sets its own security against international security." Sufficiency requires leaders to negotiate with their adversaries and to make concessions and compromises to accommodate the interests of their adversaries, they contend.

While the generals acknowledge in principle the importance of political means, they also warn that reliance on political means in practice can be dangerous. In a virtual challenge to Gorbachev's formulation at the congress, Lt. Gen. of Aviation V. Serebryannikov went to great lengths to illustrate the danger of too heavy a reliance on political means, citing the "lessons of the Great Patriotic War" when political measures taken to avoid war were not "combined to a sufficient degree with concern about upholding the high vigilance and combat readiness of the Armed Forces" (Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil, No. 18). Reliance on political means "engendered

excessive caution in solving problems of mobilization and deployment of troops." Thus, the lesson of 1941, he concluded, is not to allow "the belittling of the role of a strong and indestructible defense." Serebryannikov also warned that reliance on political means can create a danger of psychological disarmament. History provides many examples, he said, of cases when "negotiations and even a policy of 'normalization' of relations have been used by aggressors to weaken the vigilance of their future opponents."

Lushev, too, while seeming to agree that common sense in modern times dictates the use of political rather than military means to solve international disputes, denied that the USSR's adversaries aide by the rules of rationality. "Contrary to common sense," he warned in his International Affairs article, the United States is preparing for a global nuclear war or at least local nuclear war and counting on "the subordination of politics to the cult of force." Lushev also cautioned that treaties and agreements can be broken, telling his readers that the United States, Great Britain, and other capitalist countries allegedly reneged on agreed principles of the postwar political settlement and that the United States has "cast aside" nuclear arms limitation agreements in its "drive to achieve unilateral military superiority." Lushev's bottom line was that military means are still preferable to political ones: "As long as a political mechanism of blocking war is lacking, the Soviet Army and Navy must guide themselves by the incontestable truth that the better prepared they are, the less likely it is that the aggressor will start a nuclear conflict."

Reducing defense spending

The civilians' advocacy of the doctrine of sufficiency seems clearly aimed at laying the theoretical groundwork for negotiated arms reductions and subsequent reduced defense spending—as part of resource reallocations needed for the Gorbachev leadership's economic restructuring plans. Primakov in his 4 June television appearance spelled out the link between the concept of reasonable sufficiency and defense budget savings and repeated this assertion in an article in the 7 November issue of Sovetskaya Kultura. He announced that Gorbachev's restructuring requires "the best possible correlation" of defense and socioeconomic spending because the USSR is "more acutely than ever before" facing the need to increase spending on socioeconomic development. The solution, he continued, "lies in the formula of reasonable sufficiency of means for defense."

Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov in their New Times article also claimed that adopting a policy of reasonable sufficiency would allow the USSR to take unilateral steps toward limiting and reducing armaments. Making defense cuts contingent on reciprocal action from the other side is wrong, they argued, because it allows "the side that is interested in continuing the arms race" to block all progress toward limitations or reductions. They cited several examples of successful, unilateral reductions, including the USSR's demobilization of 8.5 million men after World War II and its reduction of over 2 million men in 1955–1958.

The generals, by contrast, continue to insist that defense spending should be increased rather than reduced. In the June issue of Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, Lushev seemed to take issue with a cost-conscious approach to improving "combat readiness" that focuses on improvements in discipline, training, and morale. He insisted on a "comprehensive" approach to increasing combat readiness that included not only the "fullest consideration of the development prospects of combat equipment" but also personnel, weapons, and materiel. All these elements of combat readiness, he concluded, constitute "a single complex in which there should be no weak link or unconsidered 'detail.'"

Akhromeyev: An exception

Despite the clear tendency by senior military officers to reject sufficiency and its controversial implications, Gorbachev and the civilians appear to have at least one sympathizer among the top brass—Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff. Akhromeyev's views, expressed most fully in a 9 May article in Krasnaya Zvezda, appeared to support many of the civilian contentions. He did not insist on strict parity but rather endorsed a "rough equilibrium" at a level "sufficient to ensure a reliable defense," a formulation that comes close to endorsing the civilian definition of sufficiency. Akhromeyev also joined the civilians in arguing the importance of political means to prevent war and seemed strongly to suggest that further military buildup would be pointless by asserting that "nowadays it is impossible to ensure security merely by improving one's sword and shield. . . . The security of each state . . . can only be achieved by limiting and reducing armaments and strengthening confidence-building measures and international cooperation among countries."

Akhromeyev has played key roles in the arms control negotiations at the Reykjavik summit and in the discussions this fall that led to an INF agreement that will require the Soviet Union to scrap asymmetrically large numbers of INF missiles and warheads. At Reykjavik he headed the Soviet "Group of Experts" charged with handling the technical details of arms reduction and verification measures. In the most recent negotiations in Geneva between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (23–24 November), Akhromeyev apparently was a major actor in the negotiations on INF issues, particularly verification. It was he who handled the technical questions on verification at Shevardnadze's 24 November news conference (TASS, 25 November).

Outlook

The sharp division of opinion between the civilian analysts and leading military figures over the definition of reasonable sufficiency suggests that both the civilian analysts and the military suspect that Gorbachev is intent, at the very least, on reducing the rate of growth in military expenditures. It also indicates that, despite the setback delivered to the military by the Rust affair last May, which resulted in the firing of Defense Minister Sokolov, the Soviet military is by no means giving up its claim to resources. Although the civilians appear to have the ear of some members of the Politburo, particularly Gorbachev and Yakovlev, as newcomers to discussions of security affairs they will only be able to prevail in the long term over the military in defining sufficiency if backed firmly by the party leadership.

Drawing on their expertise, their access to information, and their prestige, the generals seem likely to try to create a climate in which the civilian arguments on sufficiency seem at best naive. Continued attacks from the military could also create political problems for the general secretary. High-ranking party officials, already upset about other elements of his reform program, may seek to use the generals' criticism of sufficiency as additional ammunition against Gorbachev. On the other hand, a victory for the civilian intellectuals would provide a rationale for further steps in arms control and defense cuts that would free up resources needed to carry out Gorbachev's ambitious plans for revitalizing the civilian economy.

APPENDIX G

"NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP [NPG] COMMUNIQUE" FROM THE NPG AUTUMN MINISTERIAL MEETING AT MONTEBELLO, QUEBEC, CANADA, IN OCTOBER, 1983 (WHICH MEETING PRODUCED THE SO-CALLED "MONTEBELLO AGREEMENT" OR "MONTEBELLO DECISION" CONCERNING NATO FORCE MODERNIZATION) AND "STATUS OF THE NATO 'MONTEBELLO DECISION'" PREPARED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

In October, 1983, at Montebello, Quebec, Canada, the NATO NPG declared that the policy of the alliance was to maintain nuclear deterrence by retiring outmoded or unnecessary weapons and modernizing the remainder of the force—with the aim of reducing the overall number of weapons in Europe to the minimum needed for effective deterrence and anticipated needs in case a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict occurs. Europeans, NATO officials (including the U.S. Mission to NATO), and U.S. commanders in Europe are very familiar with the Montebello Agreement, and NATO and U.S. commanders are strongly committed to pursuing its provisions. Most of the agreed withdrawals of obsolete and unneeded nuclear warheads, shells, and other devices have been completed, but much of the stipulated modernization has not yet occurred. These modernization efforts—including fielding a follow-on to the Lance SNF missile much desired by U.S. ground force commanders—can occur without any danger of violating the terms of the INF Treaty. There are indications that accomplishing all of the Montebello objectives can enable some further reductions in the overall numbers of nuclear devices in NATO's arsenal. This appendix consists of the communique issued at the conclusion of the Montebello Ministerial meeting, and a status report on implementation of the Montebello Decision just issued by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

DOCUMENTATION

NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP COMMUNIQUE

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) held its Autumn Ministerial meeting at Montebello, Quebec, Canada on 27 and 28 October, 1983. Spain attended as an observer.

Ministers discussed a wide range of security matters. In particular, they discussed a comprehensive study prepared by the High Level Group. The terms of the Montebello Decision taken on 27 October, 1983 which resulted from this are set out in full at Annex to this Communiqué.

Ministers reaffirmed that the supreme objective of the Alliance is the maintenance of peace in freedom. A stable military balance to be established at the lowest possible level is essential to this objective. They emphasized that it was not necessary for the Alliance to match the Soviet Union system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead. Although nuclear forces at all ranges play an important role in maintaining an unbroken spectrum of deterrence, only the minimum number of these forces necessary to support the Alliance's agreed strategy of deterrence and defence should be retained in NATO's inventory.

Ministers noted that, in contrast to NATO's policy of restraint, the Soviet build-up is continuing relentlessly at all levels. In recent months the Soviet Union has continued construction of at least three new SS-20 bases east of the Ural Mountains, in addition to the already deployed 351 operational SS-20 launchers comprising 1,053 warheads. They are also retaining older shorter-range missiles by a new generation of more accurate systems, namely the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23, which have been under development for a number of years.

SS-21s have already been forward deployed in Eastern Europe for some time. Ministers noted that the Soviet Union has recently threatened to deploy forward additional shorter-range missiles and to adopt other military and political measures should NATO proceed as planned with the deployment of LRINF in Europe. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to match NATO's restraint and to reduce rather than increase the levels of its nuclear weapons.

Ministers supported the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain the deterrent capabilities of their strategic forces, while recognizing that only the strategic forces of the United States have the capability to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for all members of the Alliance. At the same time, they welcomed the proposals the United States has made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks to reduce the most destabilizing weapons and to reduce substantially the level of United States and Soviet strategic arms, including the 'build-down' concept recently tabled in Geneva. Ministers agreed that such proposals could serve as the basis for an effective agreement which would enhance the stability and security of all countries concerned.

Ministers emphasized their determination to move ahead with the dual-track approach of modernization and arms control with respect to LRINF. They noted with satisfaction that the flight testing of both the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in the United States had been successfully completed, that production of the missiles is on schedule and that the preparations in the European basing countries would permit initial operational capability, as planned. Ministers emphasized NATO's commitment and determination that, in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement obviating the need for that deployment, deployment of a mixed force of ballistic and cruise missiles as decided in the dual-track decision of 1979 will begin by the end of the year.

Ministers reaffirmed that the United States proposal in the INF negotiations, developed in close consultation with the Allies, to eliminate the entire category of United States and Soviet land-based longer-range INF missiles remains the best and most equitable outcome. They welcomed the continuing close consultations within the Alliance on the negotiations. Ministers fully supported the United States' offer of an interim agreement providing for United States and Soviet equality in missile and warhead numbers. They also supported the United States determination in Geneva to explore every proposed solution for an INF arms control agreement that meets the legitimate security concerns of the Alliance. The basic criteria of such an agreement are: significant reductions based on equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion of or compensation for third-country systems, global limitations, no weakening of the United States contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defence, and effective verification.

Ministers welcomed the latest United States initiatives which address concerns that the Soviet Union has expressed in Geneva on aircraft, geographic scope and reductions of the Pershing II as well as cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated similar flexibility.

Each Soviet modification of their original proposal made so far would have the same basic outcome: the prohibition of any NATO LRINF missile deployments while the Soviet Union retained a monopoly in such missiles. This is because of their insistence to take into account British and French forces and their refusal to accept the principle of equality in LRINF missile deployments. The Alliance cannot accept this Soviet approach which is apparently intended to further their long-term aim of dividing the Alliance and to erode seriously the linkage between the United States strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe. This linkage is essential for NATO's security.

Ministers noted with attention the most recent Soviet proposals. The Soviets are invited to explain fully their proposals at the negotiating table. Ministers stated that NATO would continue to examine carefully all proposals in light of the Alliance's agreed criteria described above. As reported, however, the Soviet Union regrettably continues to insist on a monopoly in land-based LRINF missiles. The West has continued to negotiate for two years while the Soviet SS-20 build-up has continued. The Soviets therefore have absolutely no justification for breaking off negotiations as NATO's deployment goes forward, as they have threatened. Ministers stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would continue even after initial deployments and that they remain willing to reverse, halt or modify deployments – including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed - if and when a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement is achieved in Geneva.

Ministers accepted with pleasure an invitation from Mr. U. Haluk Bayülken, the Turkish Minister of National Defence, to hold their next meeting in Turkey in Spring 1984.

The Danish Minister of Defence repeated Danish Government support for the double track decision but at the same time he recalled the motion passed by the Folketing on May 26.

Greece has expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes.

ANNEX
THE MONTEBELLO DECISION

At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministers declared that the policy of the Alliance is to preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.

Consistent with this policy the Alliance since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed at assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces.

On the basis of the initial results of these analyses, the Alliance decided in December 1979 that, unless obviated by successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, the development of longer-range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) was essential to restoring the balance and maintaining the integrity of NATO's deterrent posture. The Alliance remains committed to the dual-track decision and its implementation[1]. At the same time Ministers decided to reduce the NATO stockpile by 1,000 warheads. This withdrawal has been completed. Moreover, Ministers mandated further analysis to determine whether the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1,000 then decided could be accomplished safely, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons.

With the Alliance analysis now complete, the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th October, 1983 to withdraw 1,400 warheads during the next several years. The Ministerial decision, taken together with the already accomplished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads will bring to 2,400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.

The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. NATO's military authorities should report their findings at a future NPG meeting.

Recognizing that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective. Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The Alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the example set by the Alliance, to halt and reverse its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO in the search for a safer future.

1 Greece has expressed its views in the minutes of the NPG at Montebello.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, DC, February 18, 1988.

To: Honorable Timothy E. Wirth.
From: Stanley R. Sloan, Specialist in U.S. Alliance Relations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.
Subject: Status of the NATO Montebello Decision.

In response to your request, we are forwarding this brief summary of the so-called Montebello Decision and the current status of its implementation. A copy of the official unclassified account of the decision is attached to this memorandum.

Background to the Montebello Decision

In December 1979, when the NATO allies decided to deploy new intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe while seeking arms control limitations on such systems, they also agreed to reduce by 1,000 NATO's inventory of nuclear warheads deployed in Europe. This reduction in nuclear warheads was completed in 1980. Following the 1979 "dual track" decision, the allies began a "shift-study" to examine the overall balance between short- and medium-range nuclear systems in NATO's inventory and their relation to NATO's deterrent strategy. This study was conducted under the auspices of the High Level Group (HLG), a special task force originally set up by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1977. The HLG study led to the Montebello Decision, issued at a meeting of the NPG defense ministers at Montebello, Quebec, Canada on October 28, 1983.

Content of the Montebello Decision

The Montebello Decision expressed NATO's goal of "assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces." Based on the High Level Group's recommendations, the Nuclear Planning Group called for withdrawing 1,400 additional nuclear warheads from NATO's inventory. This withdrawal was completed by the end of 1987, reportedly bringing NATO's nuclear inventory to under 4,600 warheads. The warheads to be removed were those associated with systems determined by NATO to be obsolete or unnecessary to implement NATO's strategy. According to open-source accounts, the withdrawals included atomic demolition land mines, Honest John and Pershing Ia warheads, and warheads for the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles which are being replaced by the conventionally-armed Patriot missile system. The weapons remaining in NATO's nuclear inventory after the withdrawals include 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery shells, air-delivered nuclear weapons (bombs), nuclear depth charges, and warheads for the surface-to-surface Lance missile system (as well as warheads for the Pershing II ballistic and ground launched cruise missiles until they are withdrawn as proposed in the INF Treaty).

The modernization portion of the Montebello Decision declared that "to make the most effective contribution to deterrence," the remaining nuclear warheads and delivery systems should be "survivable, responsive and effective." Without elaboration, the decision said that the NPG defense ministers and "identified a range of possible improvements" to bring the remaining inventory up to those standards.

Status of the Montebello Decision Program

The "possible improvements" in the Montebello Decision have been extensively studied within the alliance as well as within the U.S. Government. On January 25, 1988, U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci submitted a report to the Congress on "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990s." [1] The report notes that the removal of INF warheads from Europe, combined with earlier reductions of nuclear devices, would cut NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe to about 4,000 weapons. The report described and recommended implementation of the main elements of the NATO theater nuclear force modernization program initiated by the Montebello Decision. The elements include:

—development of a Follow-on to the Lance (FOTL) missile with increased range, improved accuracy, and improved operating characteristics;
—development of a standoff Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM);
—modernization of NATO's Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAPs); and

[1] U.S. Department of Defense. Support of NATO strategy in the 1990's; a report to the United States Congress in compliance with Public Law 100-180, January 25, 1988. Appearing in the Congressional Record, January 27, 1988, p. S125-S137.

—continued modernization of NATO's dual-capable aircraft and associated nuclear bombs.

In addition, the report noted that the Montebello modernization program calls for correcting what is seen as the maldeployment of nuclear capabilities among and within regions as well as improving the survivability and command and control of NATO's nuclear forces.

The Nuclear Planning Group is currently studying how the theater nuclear force posture might be further adjusted in light of the INF agreement. In order to move forward, however, the nuclear modernization program would have to overcome several obstacles. The Congress in recent years has not approved certain potential components of the modernization program. The Congress has not authorized development of a nuclear capability for the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which the Administration sees as a likely replacement for the Lance. The Congress has also prohibited the deployment in Europe of nuclear artillery shells with enhanced radiation (neutron) capabilities and has set a limit of 975 on production of artillery-fired atomic projectiles.

Furthermore, significant political problems have arisen within the alliance that could block or, at a minimum, delay modernization. The West German Government has emphasized that, after the INF missile systems are withdrawn, most of the remaining NATO nuclear arsenal will be located on West German territory. Many West Germans reason that implementation of the INF agreement leaves Germany exposed to greater nuclear risks and political pressures than other members of the alliance. The West German Government is additionally concerned that a decision by NATO to modernize its short-range nuclear arsenal would encounter strong domestic public and political opposition.

Under these circumstances, the West Germans would prefer that NATO balance its modernization program with efforts to reduce, but not eliminate, short range nuclear forces through arms control agreements with the East. This approach has in turn created concern on both sides of the Atlantic, but particularly in France, about the dangers of denuclearization—removing nuclear elements from NATO's deterrent posture in Europe and possibly calling into question the legitimacy of France's independent nuclear deterrent. Until a way is found to resolve the conflicts between West Germany's concerns and the aspects of the modernization program that affect German interests most directly, the alliance will find it difficult to decide to deploy any new or modernized nuclear systems on German territory, effectively blocking further implementation of the Montebello program.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Accompanying me on the trip which is the subject of this report were Mr. John Hamre, professional staff member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; Mr. T. Scott Bunton, my chief of staff; Mr. Robert K. Griffith, Jr., my legislative assistant for national security; and Lieutenant Colonel Everette L. Roper, Jr., Army Congressional Liaison. I wish to express appreciation for their help in making the arrangements for this trip and for the briefings that preceded it, and in producing this report from my suggestions and notes.

I also wish to acknowledge the significant efforts of the many other persons who were instrumental in arranging various aspects of the trip and whose contributions assured that it would be as valuable as it was. I offer special thanks to the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army; the protocol offices of U.S. Army/Europe , U.S. Forces/ Berlin, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe; the Congressional Liaison Office of the Department of State; the Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in Warsaw and his staff; the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO and his staff; the commanders and the men and women of the U.S. and other NATO units with whom I visited; and the crews of the Air Force and Army aircraft which provided transportation in Europe.

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